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While this battle was still in its inception, and the attackers had as yet made 
little progress, writers here and there began to direct their shafts at other parts 
of the wall, and to cry for an extension of the strict liability to products other 
than food. For a long time the battlements held firm against all the raiding par-
ties; and until the nineteen fifties no major breach occurred. The wall is still 
stoutly defended . . . . Of late, however, there has been here and there a breach; 
the assault goes on apace, and as the nineteen sixties are upon us, it becomes 
evident that we are to witness a new onslaught, which may lead to the most des-
perate struggle of all.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The extension of strict liability to products other than food was, for Wil-
liam Prosser, a battle to be described in epic terms, a battle fought by “writers 
                                                        
*  Professor from Practice at Seattle University School of Law (2012–2014) and founding 
partner of the first law firm that focused exclusively on the representation of plaintiffs in-
jured by unsafe food and drink, Marler Clark. This article is dedicated, with sincere grati-
tude, to Bill Marler, a visionary and wholly compassionate food-safety attorney who I am 
privileged to call my friend. 
1  William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1110–11 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, The Assault]. 
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here and there”2 to expand tort’s empire into the far reaches of what had for 
long been under the control of his nemesis, contract law. But to Prosser there 
was much more at stake than control over the increasingly important realm of 
products liability law and the rules that would govern for decades the means 
and extent of recovery for injured consumers. The fact of contract law’s control 
had resulted from what Prosser presented as both a kind of treason and a failure 
of logic, both of which required redress. As Prosser thus emphasized, an action 
for breach of warranty had not only originally sounded in tort, its “old tort 
character ha[d] continued to color the substantive law of warranty itself, by 
perpetuating the idea . . . of a liability arising and imposed by operation of law, 
which is quite independent of any intention to agree upon terms as a matter of 
fact.”3 Because to Prosser (and others) it was illogical for a warranty to be im-
posed by operation of law, in the absence of agreement, there was only one so-
lution: “[L]et there be strict liability in tort, declared outright, without an illuso-
ry contract mask.”4 
To state that products liability law remains of central importance to tort law 
is merely to repeat a truism.5 But the importance of this law—and the concept 
of strict liability that sits at its core—has long overshadowed its origin in food 
cases, where courts first worked out rules that allowed those injured by unsafe 
food to recover damages. Although the importance of these early food cases 
has been recognized by a few,6 commenters have so far missed that these early 
cases clearly reflected an acceptance of the unique importance of food safety. 
Because of a consumer’s complete vulnerability to the invisible danger of adul-
teration, the need for a rule of strict liability for food was not only justifiable on 
legal grounds; it was also necessary on practical grounds. 
What happened next, though, shifted the focus from the importance of food 
safety as something arguably unique to the asserted importance of all consum-
ers to have a remedy at law when injured by a defective product. Seekers of a 
rule of strict liability in tort to govern all products took to lobbing rhetorical 
questions as if brickbats. Why allow only those injured by food to recover? 
Why not a rule that applied to all product-sellers for any product-related injury? 
As Fleming James observed, “[s]urely greater danger lurks in a defective auto-
                                                        
2  Id. at 1110. 
3  Id. at 1126–27. 
4  Id. at 1134. 
5  See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 887 (3d 
ed. 2012) (“Products liability claims stand at the center of modern tort law.”). 
6  Id. at 896 (querying in a note following Justice Roger Traynor’s concurring opinion in Es-
cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944), “Is there any reason why food-
stuffs—and in Escola, a soft drink bottle—should have been among the first sorts of prod-
ucts in which strict liability would apply? Did it aid Traynor’s cause that he was able to write 
his opinion in a case in which the defective ‘product’ was a bottled beverage?”). Goldberg 
also points out that Traynor cited to “a well-known New York decision authored by Judge 
Cardozo. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 175 N.E. 105 (N.Y. 1931)”. Id. For a further 
discussion of Traynor and the Escola concurrence, see infra, Part I.D. 
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mobile wheel than in a pebble in a can of beans.”7 The grand plan was thus 
hatched by Prosser to execute a kind of bait-and-switch, using the food cases to 
first gain acceptance of a rule of strict liability in torts, and then by analogy ex-
tend the rule to all products.8 And so would be born tort’s new and expanded 
empire. 
This article critiques the decision of the American Law Institute (“ALI”)9 
to abandon the first-adopted version of Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, a version that applied the rule of strict liability to food only.10 
The first-adopted version read as follows: 
One engaged in the business of selling food for human consumption who sells 
such food in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is 
subject to liability for bodily harm thereby caused to one who consumes it, even 
though 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of food, 
and 
                                                        
7  Fleming James, Jr., General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence? 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1957), see also Denis W. Stearns, A Continuing Plague: 
Faceless Transactions and the Coincident Rise of Food Adulteration and Legal Regulation 
of Quality, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 421, 423–24 (2014) (noting that Fleming James and others, 
including Prosser, thought food cases too trivial, reinforcing their eagerness to have strict 
liability apply to all products, not just food). 
8  Stearns, supra note 7, at 427–29 (arguing that, for reasons both ontological and sociologi-
cal, food is a category unto itself and, as a result, any analogy to it must be false). 
9  The American Law Institute was formed on February 23, 1923 during a meeting held in 
Washington D.C., where those gathered unanimously resolved as follows: 
That we approve the formation of the American Law Institute, the object of which shall be to 
promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, 
to secure the better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and 
to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work. 
William Draper Lewis, The First Restatement of the Law and How We Did It, 25 NEB. L. 
REV. 206, 206 (1946) (offering a plainly congratulatory depiction of the ALI’s founding and 
first Restatement). Assessing the results of the project, Draper writes: 
We started with the belief that out of the mass of case authority and legal literature could be 
made clear statements of the rules of the common law today operative in the great majority of 
our states, expressed as simply as the character of our complex civilization admits. The result 
shows that this belief was justified. 
Id. at 215. It perhaps goes without saying that there are many who view the ALI and its Re-
statement project differently than those that had conceived and controlled and, thus, been 
quite proud of the project. See, e.g., Jack Van Doren, A Restatement of Jurisprudence: Why 
Not? 44 GONZ. L. REV. 159, 163 (2009) (describing the origins of the ALI and its project, 
and pointing out that “the Restatement Movement was controversial both within the ALI, 
which produced it, and by others outside the ALI”); G. Edward White, The American Law 
Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 3 (1997) 
(“[T]he formation of the American Law Institute can be thought of as an effort to resist as 
well as to embrace perceived changes in early twentieth-century American life.”). 
10  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961) [hereinafter Ten-
tative Draft No. 6]. Among the three caveats that were included with this draft was one stat-
ing that the ALI “express[ed] no opinion as to whether the rule stated in this Section may not 
apply . . . to articles other than food.” Id. 
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(b) the consumer has not bought the food from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller.11 
At the time, no one questioned that the rationale for a rule of strict liability 
for food was compelling. As noted in comment b, “[s]ince the early days of the 
common law those engaged in the business of selling food intended for human 
consumption have been held to a high degree of responsibility for their prod-
ucts.”12 As this comment further explained: 
[T]he justification for the strict liability has been said to be that the seller, by 
marketing his food for consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special re-
sponsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by 
it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of a product so vi-
tally important to human existence and welfare as food, that reputable sellers 
will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of ac-
cidental injuries caused by products vital to the life and health of the community 
be placed upon those who market them, . . . and that the consumer of food is en-
titled to the maximum of protection at the hands of some one, and the people to 
afford it are those who market the food.13 
In sum, because food is vital to human existence, and to the life and health 
of the community, all agreed that the “special responsibility” of those making 
food necessarily provided reason to a rule of strict liability for food.14 
Despite this agreement, there remained a dispute as to whether the rationale 
in support of strict liability for food manufacturers could also be extended to 
distributors and other non-manufacturing sellers. In a “Note to the Institute,” 
members were informed that “a large majority” approved the application of this 
rule to food manufacturers, but the “Council are [sic] about evenly divided as to 
whether it should apply to retailers and wholesalers.”15 The twin rationales of-
fered for imposing strict liability against all those in the chain of distribution 
were consumer-friendly and pragmatic: “obtaining jurisdiction over [retailers] 
where the manufacturer is at a distance, and the theory that not the plaintiff, but 
the merchant, should fight it out with manufacturer by seeking indemnity from 
him.”16 These rationales, however, best applied to food retailers—specifically, 
those selling direct-to-the-public and not to wholesalers or distributors.17 Once 
                                                        
11  Id. 
12  Id. § 402A cmt. b. 
13  Id. (emphasis added). 
14  Id. The basis for this special rule is noted later in the draft as being “the ancient one of the 
special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the busi-
ness of supplying human beings with products for internal consumption.” Id. § 402A cmt. d. 
15  Id. § 402A note to Institute. All twelve of the “advisers”—one of whom was Roger Tray-
nor—were said to have agreed, “that both retailers and wholesalers should be included.” Id. 
16  Id. It is true, of course, that chain-of-distribution liability is more convenient for plain-
tiffs—that is, “a shortcut which makes any supplier in the chain liable directly to the user.” 
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. 
REV. 791, 799–800 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall]. 
17  Indeed, Prosser’s depiction of how food is manufactured, distributed, and sold is both 
oversimplified and inconsistent, assuming most food products have one manufacturer and 
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the rule is applied to non-food products, and extended along the entire chain of 
distribution, the sufficiency (or even applicability) of the rationales becomes 
much less clear. As such, it is hardly surprising that there was disagreement 
over the rule’s extension. 
Notwithstanding the disagreement, Prosser pushed forward with the efforts 
to extend the rule further still, beyond food itself. And in so doing, he ignored 
the inevitability of even bigger disagreements in the future. He no doubt had 
confidence in his ability to address such disagreements if and when they arose. 
Much more important was the need to take the next step in the extension of the 
rule, which occurred on May 23–26, 1962, at the thirty-ninth annual meeting of 
the ALI.18 The new version of the rule expanded the category of products to 
which strict liability applied, pivoting from a definition restricted to “all prod-
ucts intended for internal human consumption”—that is, food—to a definition 
that included “products for intimate bodily use.”19 The newly included products 
were those for so-called “external consumption,” such as clothing, hair dye, 
cosmetics, and soap, all of which had been explicitly excluded from the prior 
version of the rule.20 Prosser justified this extension by pointing to: [r]ecent de-
cisions, since 1950, [that] have extended this special rule of strict liability . . . to 
the closely analogous cases of other products intended for intimate bodily use, 
where, for example as in the case of cosmetics, the application to the body of 
the consumer is external rather than internal.21 
In justifying the extension of the “special rule,” Prosser cites only ten cas-
es, with the products being hair dye, soap, laundry detergent, permanent wave 
                                                                                                                                
then a number of non-manufacturing sellers in the chain-of-distribution. See Prosser, The 
Assault, supra note 1, at 1117 (describing the “wholesaler, the jobber, and the retailer” as 
doing nothing to a product that would normally subject them to negligence liability). For a 
much more nuanced and accurate description of how food products are manufactured and 
distributed, from a contemporary of Prosser, see REED DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
THE FOOD CONSUMER 148–56 (1951) (explaining how the “presumed . . . sharp dichotomy 
between the concepts of ‘maker’ and ‘distributor’ ” is for the ease of categorization, but not 
an accurate depiction of how food is in fact products are made and distributed, and that 
“[b]etween the extremes of all-manufacturer and all-distributor is every combination of mak-
ing and distributing”). See also Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 
OR. L. REV. 119, 129 (1958) (“Direct dealing between consumers and manufacturers is not 
typical of the distribution of goods in modern society, but it does occur frequently, especially 
in the food industry.”). 
18  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962) [hereinafter Ten-
tative Draft No. 7]. See also Elizabeth Laposata et al., Tobacco Industry Influence on the 
American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest 
Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9–17, 26–30 (2012) (providing a detailed summary of the early 
drafts of Section 402A, while arguing somewhat unconvincingly that cigarettes would have 
“easily” fit the definition of food as then proposed). 
19  Tentative Draft No. 7, supra note 18, § 402A. 
20  Tentative Draft No. 6, supra note 10, § 402A cmt. c. 
21  Tentative Draft No. 7, supra note 18 § 402A cmt. b (emphasis added). 
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solution, clothing (a grass hula skirt), cigarettes, a surgical pin, and a polio vac-
cine.22 
But was the analogy as close as Prosser claimed? Was unwholesome sau-
sage (something you ate) really analogous to a “permanent waves” solution (a 
foul-smelling chemical product that you applied to your scalp and hair)?23 In 
what way is food “closely analogous” to a grass hula skirt that caught fire, se-
verely burning a child?24 In addition, is it even possible to speak coherently 
about consumption being external, unless consumption means nothing other 
than use or application, with no meaningful difference between putting on a 
skirt and eating a sandwich? Yet, regardless of whether the expanded product 
category made sense, the revised rule was still adopted. More importantly (at 
least for purposes of the extension that happened next), the version adopted was 
now sufficiently disconnected from its original food-safety rationale that ap-
plicability to all products was now more likely to occur. If strict liability could 
apply to food, a hula skirt, and a chemical hair product, there was no obvious 
limit to the rule’s application. In essence, the special rule for food was forgot-
ten. 
Approximately two years after having extended the special rule of strict li-
ability for food to products applied externally to the body, the ALI adopted one 
last version of Section 402A, which applied to products of all kinds, with only a 
few specific exemptions.25 Although the “good tobacco” exemption has recent-
ly been criticized as evidence of the tobacco industry’s influence over the draft-
ing process, such criticism misses a crucial point. If the goal was, as I argue, to 
adopt a rule that applied as broadly as possible, it made no sense for Prosser to 
risk having any particular industry scuttle the rule of strict liability overall.26 
                                                        
22  Id. § 402A list of supporting cases. Of these varied cases, one is noted to have been “re-
versed on other grounds,” and two others are noted to have involved express warranty 
claims. Id. 
23  Compare Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 831–32, 834 (Tex. 
1942) (holding, in a case that involved “contaminated and poisonous” sausage that killed a 
child, that “the liability of the manufacturer and vendor is imposed by operation of law as a 
matter of public policy for the protection of the public, and is not dependent on any provi-
sion of the contract, either expressed or implied.”), with Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 
Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181, 182, 188 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (allowing recovery despite lack of priv-
ity for a plaintiff who “suffered injury to her face and scalp and hair (her hair almost com-
pletely falling out)” from the application of a “chemical product known as ‘Prom Home 
Permanent’ ”). 
24  Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Haw. 1961) (affirming the jury verdict favoring 
the minor and her parents in her action alleging breach of warranty of fitness of a grass skirt 
sold by the store owners to the minor’s aunt). 
25  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964) [hereinafter 
Tentative Draft No. 10] (“One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
26  See Laposata, supra note 18, at 67–68 (arguing that courts should stop applying Restate-
ment rules in tobacco lawsuits because “the ALI was so skillfully manipulated by the tobac-
co industry in its creation of the Second and Third Restatements” of Torts); see also Van 
15 NEV. L.J. 106 - STEARNS.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:58 PM 
112 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:106 
The assault upon the citadel had begun with a battle “directed against a narrow 
segment of the wall, defended only by the sellers of food and drink.”27 Having 
vanquished these product sellers, and then successfully expanded the battlefront 
to nearly all other products, it would have made no sense at all to pick a fight 
that might lead to greater losses just as near-total victory was so close at hand. 
The final version of Section 402A was promulgated the following year, 
along with the other sections in the second volume of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.28 Once adopted by courts, Section 402A would “(1) do away with the 
privity requirement at all levels of manufacturing and distribution, and (2) im-
pose on each seller coming within its terms the responsibility of strict liabil-
ity.”29 It was this imposition of strict liability to all products that most now 
characterize as the product liability revolution.30 As one tort scholar has sum-
marized: 
                                                                                                                                
Doren, supra note 9, at 160–61 & nn.6–7 (arguing that the lobbying of special interest 
groups “destabiliz[ed] the original Restatement objectives”). 
27  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1103. 
28  2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
29  Reed Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 585, 
587 (1961). Dickerson goes on to ask whether,“[i]n doing away with privity, would the pro-
posed section reflect the preponderance of existing law, or would it pull itself up by its own 
bootstraps by purporting to reflect law that it was only creating?” Id. (agreeing that only for 
food could “a good case . . . be made for calling this a true restatement”). White makes a 
similar indictment about Prosser’s overall enterprise, accusing him of “claiming, on less than 
fulsome evidence, the existence of a ‘trend’ toward acceptance of the strict liability princi-
ple,” calling this “a good example of how to impress by sleight-of-hand techniques.” G. 
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 173 (expanded ed. 
2000). 
30  See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 687 (1993) (providing an exhaustively re-
searched and clearly written overview of “both the evolution of products liability and the 
ongoing debates over the efficiency of modern products liability”). This article is especially 
noteworthy for being of a period in which product liability law was coming under sustained 
attack from multiple fronts, a fact it concisely summarizes. Id. at 684–87 & nn.1–14. See al-
so James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liabil-
ity: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 480 (1990) (“Most revolu-
tions are noisy, tumultuous affairs. This is as true of significant shifts in legal doctrine as it is 
of shifts of political power through force of arms.”); George L. Priest, The Invention of En-
terprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 
J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985) (“Since 1960, our modern civil liability regime has experi-
enced a conceptual revolution that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-
American legal system.”). But see David G. Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern 
Products Liability Law: A Comment on Priest’s View of the Cathedral’s Foundations, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 529, 531 (1985) (criticizing Priest for his focus on the contributions of James 
and Kessler, which is said to have left “crucial gaps in the intellectual genealogy of products 
liability law”). See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION 
OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 1 (1983) (introducing the stories “[t]his book tells,” in-
cluding “that the Western legal tradition was born of a ‘revolution’ and thereafter, during the 
course of many centuries, has been periodically interrupted and transformed by revolu-
tions”). 
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This doctrinal revolution was remarkably swift. What began in 1958 as a 
modest proposal for strict tort liability for the sale of food “in a condition dan-
gerous to the consumer,” was extended three years later to cover “other products 
for intimate bodily use” in a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
consumer.” By 1964, the final form of section 402A applied to “any product.” 
This expansion of the strict liability rule, however, was not accompanied by a 
thorough analysis of the implications of bringing new classes of products within 
the sweep of section 402A.31 
Thorough analysis or not, such a revolutionary expansion could not, it 
seems, have occurred without “a great Master of Torts”32 to boldly lead the way 
forward into battle, restoring warranty principles to the law of torts and claim-
ing products liability law for the tort patriots. Nonetheless, the second-guessing 
and disputes began almost immediately.33 What was not disputed, then or now, 
                                                        
31  Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort 
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 860 (1983) (footnotes omitted) (examining the debates sur-
rounding the adoption of Section 402A and Comment k while arguing in favor of strict lia-
bility for design defects involving generic product risks unknown at the time of sale); see 
also Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus 
Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 888–89 (2002) (questioning 
whether the adoption of Section 402A, coupled with the Henningsen and Greenman deci-
sions that preceded it, “precipitated—or perhaps anticipated—a storm of litigation that grew 
with unparalleled speed”). I mostly agree with the proposed answer to this question: 
Perhaps these decisions by influential courts and the adoption of strict products liability by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) generated the rapid expansion of products liability litigation. Or 
maybe they were merely at the cutting edge of a change that would have taken hold in the courts 
regardless. The answer is, of course, elusive and subject to debate. Perhaps the safest speculation 
is that the prestige of the California and New Jersey courts and the ALI, and the general societal 
trend toward increased concern for the safety of individual consumers, both played important 
roles in products liability’s explosive growth. 
Id. at 888 n.55. 
32  Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectu-
al History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (summarizing the life of William Prosser, in 
near-hagiographic terms, as an introduction to a consideration of the detailed notes that a 
first-year law student took during Prosser’s 1938 fall semester Torts class at the University 
of Minnesota). 
33  For example, a “petition for rehearing” was made shortly after Section 402A was adopted 
in final form. See Jay M. Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Peti-
tion for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 (1965). Smyser presciently stated that “[i]t is a dis-
tinct possibility that the respect the Restatement has attained will be undermined to the extent 
the new version, by departing from the purposes of the original, becomes simply another fo-
rum from which various interests can argue for changes in the legal framework of society.” 
Id. at 345. Of course, Smyser plainly assumes that the ALI’s efforts were not an argument 
for change, as driven by Prosser, all along. The “Petition” does not appear to have had much 
in the way of impact, with a total of forty-one law review articles citing to it, mostly in the 
1960s. George Priest cited the article in 1985, noting “Smyser does indicate some suspicion 
of Prosser’s evidence [that strict liability for all products was doubtlessly “the rule of the 
near future”], but he does not comprehensively evaluate the case law support of Prosser’s 
claim.” See Priest, supra note 30, at 517 n.361. For the most recent citation, see David A. 
Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the “Flagrant 
Trespasser”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1457 and n.46 (2011) (citing Smyser as an 
example of the “sharp criticism” that the adoption of Section 402A had engendered, and go-
15 NEV. L.J. 106 - STEARNS.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:58 PM 
114 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:106 
is that a revolution did in fact occur, and that the story of the revolution has be-
come as important as what the revolution is said to have achieved. 
Set against the backdrop of this story of revolution, this article will make 
two main assertions. First, Prosser’s prodigious efforts on behalf of a rule of 
strict liability were largely imperial, an aggressive battle to wrest governance of 
product liability from contract, so that a newly expanded tort regime could 
alone govern the right to recover damages for product-related injuries. Second, 
the battle was ultimately won as a result of the decision to sacrifice food as a 
special product category, borrowing the rules worked out in food cases, but 
leaving behind food safety concerns like a battering ram no longer needed once 
the door to the citadel had been knocked open. Once the contract doctrines, like 
the rule of privity, no longer barred the way to the recovery of damages, the 
warranty of quality could be dispatched so a rule of strict liability in tort could 
ascend to throne. Food was too associated with the logic of warranty to have 
not been sacrificed, which made the idea of special rules for food a necessary 
sacrifice, too. Instead of allowing focus to remain on food and its safety, and 
for rules to develop more organically, case by case, the extension of special 
rules for food was extended by fiat and false analogy. It was a kind of coup 
d’état conceived by Fleming James, Roger Traynor, and others intent on the 
establishment of enterprise liability, but executed in the end by William Prosser 
and his bold bait-and-switch. 
I. THE MOST DESPERATE STRUGGLE: CREATING TORT’S NEW EMPIRE 
The classic story of strict liability’s emergence notably begins with the as-
sault on a citadel,34 followed by its epic fall.35 To say that this story has been 
told near-countless times would be an understatement.36 But no one has told the 
                                                                                                                                
ing on to assert that “Section 402A was built on scant doctrinal foundation, as Dean Prosser 
could point to virtually no case authority and relatively little scholarship to tease out the ap-
plication of the core concept of strict liability in tort to the variety of contexts in which prod-
ucts could harm consumers”). 
34  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1. 
35  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 791. 
36  For perhaps the best overall and neutral telling, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW 256–65 & nn.1–68 (2d ed. 2008). Owen also helpfully collects the early commentary. 
Id. at 256 n.2. See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 25–48 
(1980) (providing a historical overview with a helpful identification of the different strands 
of arguments present in the key judicial decisions); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL 
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 33–44 (1988) (offering a somewhat polemical over-
view of the rise of strict liability and its damaging displacement of more science-based gov-
ernmental regulation of product safety); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE 
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 19–24 (1993) [hereinafter SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (providing 
brief summaries of “landmark decisions”); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE 
87–95 (2003) (summarizing the “legal evolution leading to strict liability”); FRANK J. 
VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1–10 (1989) (offering a his-
torical perspective that begins with “primordial law”—that before 1850—and proceeds 
through Traynor’s majority opinion in Greenman). 
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story as memorably, and to such consequential effect, as William Prosser.37 The 
citadel was, of course, the rule of privity,38 and its fall was, according to 
Prosser, a “dramatic moment.”39 And certainly if a moment is dramatic, the 
style of its telling should be dramatic too, trumpeting the bold victories of 
“great men,”40 men whose greatness would lead to their being called “founding 
fathers”: Cardozo, Traynor, and Prosser.41 Indeed, the whole point of telling a 
                                                        
37  In 1988, Prosser’s Assault was described as “[t]he most cited products liability article ev-
er.” John B. Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enter-
prise Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131 n.3 (1988). See also Fred R. Shapiro & 
Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1489 tbl.1 (2012) (identifying Prosser’s Assault as number thirteen on the list of most cited 
law review articles). For its part, Prosser’s Fall is number thirty on the list of most cited law 
review articles. Id. at 1490. 
38  Prosser borrowed the metaphor of the citadel, and assault upon it, from Benjamin 
Cardozo. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1099 (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)). I am not certain whether Prosser missed 
Cardozo’s irony, or chose to ignore it, in his haste to borrow a metaphor that fit so well with 
the battle story he wanted to tell. Although the Ultramares decision can be read in many 
ways, one way that it cannot be read is as evidence that Cardozo was eager to expand the 
scope of negligence liability made possible by the removal of the bar of privity. Indeed, 
Cardozo was clearly concerned about the risk of potentially indeterminate liability. 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or for-
gery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in 
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 
Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444. Prosser plainly had no such concern. 
39  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 791. The hyperbole employed to describe The Fall of 
the citadel was plainly infectious. See Morton R. Covitz, Comment, Products Liability: The 
Rise and Fall of Privity, 3 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 259, 269 (1962) (“With the aban-
donment of privity, products liability is embarking on a new era. The courts now will suc-
ceed where the regulatory agencies have failed.” (emphasis added)). For those fully in sup-
port of expanding the domains that tort ruled, one consistent theme is like that expressed 
here by Covitz, that of the failure of government regulation and the courts riding to the res-
cue. 
40  Cf. THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 34 
(1840) (“The History of the world is but the Biography of great men.”); see also C.H.S. 
FIFOOT, JUDGE AND JURIST IN THE REIGN OF VICTORIA 12 (1959) (“Law, no more than any 
other human creation, is the automatic result of natural forces or intellectual movements. It is 
made by men. Whatever the pitfalls, it is less misleading to adopt or adapt Carlyle’s creed 
and approach legal history through biography.”) For an example of the application of the 
“great man” theory to legal history, see ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL 
HISTORY 124–40 (1923) (asking rhetorically whether it is “possible to make a great-lawyer 
interpretation of legal history”). Arguing that the “revolt of men is one cause of legal devel-
opment,” Pound goes on to assert that “[w]e cannot think of lawyers and judges and legisla-
tors merely as the passive instruments of ideas. We must recognize that great minds and 
masterful personalities will at least help to explain many things in legal history.” Id. at 124–
25. 
41  See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, Doctri-
nal Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 512 
(2006) (identifying Cardozo, Traynor, and Prosser as the “founding fathers” while noting 
that they “did not take products liability to maturity as a functionally distinct body of law”); 
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story so dramatically is not only to ensure the widest possible audience, but to 
ensure that the story establishes the facts, as told by the victors. This was not 
just a story; it was a history. 
As Prosser himself predicted, his role was not to write an objective report, 
to “cover a war from afar, discussing the moves of both sides.”42 Instead, he 
was to report “as a war correspondent attached to one army only.”43 His report-
ing was to be a decidedly partisan effort, the effort of one seeking to drive the 
battle to a successful end. “By clever exhortation built on a blurred interpreta-
tion of then-current legal developments, Prosser convinced the American Law 
Institute to accept and enact James’s and Kessler’s theory of enterprise liability, 
contributing to the rapid success of modern products liability law as we now 
know it.”44 He was, in the words of one scholar, an agent provocateur.45 And 
why not? For Prosser, there was too much at stake to not fight aggressively to 
expand the boundaries of tort law. As one must remember, the “boundaries on-
ly stabilize when they cease to be stakes in the game.”46 In the game that 
                                                                                                                                
see also HUBER, supra note 36, at 6 (1988) (referring to Prosser, Traynor, and John Wade as 
the “founders of modern tort law”); Michael Rustad, The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving 
Humanism in Tort Law, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (1994) (referring to Traynor, as 
well as John Wade and Thomas Lambert, as the “founding fathers of products liability”). But 
see James J. White, Reverberations from the Collision of Tort and Warranty, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 
1067, 1069 (2002) (describing the “ancient history” of how strict tort liability came to “col-
lide” with warranty, and referring to the Cardozo, Traynor, and Prosser as “our brightest ac-
tivist judges and law professors of the early and mid-twentieth century [who] set tort in mo-
tion towards the collision that now seems to have been inevitable”). Interestingly, White 
refers consistently to the period after the adoption of Section 402A as a “regime,” thus echo-
ing my point that the changes Prosser fought for represented an attempt at regime-change. Id. 
at 1068, 1072. 
42  Robinette, supra note 32, at 596 (discussing Prosser’s favorable review of Harper 
Fowler’s A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) as the kind of book needed if “we shall im-
prove the law” (quoting William L. Prosser, Book Review, 19 MINN. L. REV. 257, 259 
(1935))). 
43  Id. Prosser was to later use this metaphor to similar effect in The Assault upon the Citadel, 
in which he wrote “War correspondents with the beleaguering army are issuing daily bulle-
tins, proclaiming that the siege is all but over.” Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1099 
(footnote omitted). For the first edition of Prosser’s treatise, see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941). 
44  Priest, supra note 30, at 465. 
45  David J. Jung, Commentary on William Lloyd Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in 
California, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 861, 862 (1999) (“While Prosser cast himself as the corre-
spondent in these articles [tracing the evolution of the law of strict liability], agent provoca-
teur might more aptly capture his role . . . .”); see also SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra 
note 36, at 25 (“Prosser carried two portfolios that generated still more publication in favor 
of his thesis.”); George L. Priest, Commentary, Riding the Tide Toward Modern Tort Law: 
William Prosser’s “The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)”, 100 
Yale L.J. 1470, 1471 (1991) (“Prosser exploited Henningsen and Greenman, his command-
ing authority in the field, and his position as Reporter for the ALI Restatement of Torts to 
cement the achievement and channel products law toward modern strict liability.”). 
46  JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 17 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984). Among Lyotard’s many contributions to 
modern thought is his borrowing of Wittgenstein’s idea of “language games” to describe the 
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Prosser was playing, there could hardly have been more at stake for the law of 
torts. 
A. A Boy’s Adventure Story: The Lure of Martial Rhetoric and Thrilling Tales 
of Empire 
One reason why Prosser succeeded in crafting a story that was both com-
pelling and resonant was because he adopted the narrative structure and style of 
adventure stories for boys, stories of danger and heroism, stories of hard-fought 
battles and thrilling victories. Although it cannot be shown which specific ad-
venture stories Prosser read as a child and young man, he was said to possess “a 
prodigious memory for stories and texts.”47 Similarly, after his death, Prosser 
was recalled as: 
[T]he legendary character who could absorb the content of a written page almost 
as fast as he could turn it over; who when scarcely a teenager, would graze in the 
meadows of history and literature munching contentedly upon such pasturage as 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and other fare intended only 
for adult consumption.48 
Given that Prosser had enjoyed military history and dramatic tales of em-
pire when he was young, it is hardly surprising that his own rhetoric echoed 
storytelling notable for being imperialistic and one-sided, emphasizing the 
rightness of the battles, the well-deserved spoils of war, and the wickedness of 
the vanquished. If his goal was to “rally the troops,” so to speak, building con-
sensus among his compatriots for the battle to expand tort’s empire, then no 
rhetoric was better designed. Indeed, as early as 1938, while still working on 
the first edition of his torts treatise, he told students that the law of torts was a 
“battleground of social theories.”49 Such was the model of strategy that Prosser 
appears to have taken from the example of Fowler Harper, the treatise writer as 
“war correspondent,” and Francis Bohlen who had become the “commander-in-
chief” after being appointed to be Reporter for the Restatement of Torts.50 As 
                                                                                                                                
battles for legitimation that competing assertions about knowledge must fight out. It is in this 
regard Lyotard argues that “to speak is to fight.” Id. at 10. Prosser’s project was to create a 
narrative that depicted the extension of strict liability to all products as inevitable. 
47  THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 440 (Roger K. Newman ed., 
2009). 
48  Wex S. Malone, More in Sorrow than in Anger, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1252, 1252–53 (1972) 
(recalling also Prosser’s “insistence upon the center of the stage at all times”). See also Da-
vid W. Louisell, William Lloyd Prosser—The Myth and the Man, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 263 
(1963) (ascribing to the “Myth” of Prosser his “know[ing] all of Shakespeare and Dickens by 
heart” and the ability to “give you in sequence all of the crowned heads of Europe since 
Charlemagne, but he prefers to list them backwards”). 
49  Robinette, supra note 32, at 597 (quoting from a student’s class notebook). Not surpris-
ingly, “Prosser found all of the torts treatises lacking. Even the best American text was ‘not 
good.’ . . . Prosser had seen a need in the market, and he was working to fill it.” Id. at 598. 
50  Id. at 601. Bohlen started work in June 1923. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS intro. 
(1934). The eminent judges Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand were both involved with 
this project. Id. 
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Prosser wrote, foreshadowing his own later approach: “The army to which Mr. 
Harper has attached himself is the group primarily responsible for the Ameri-
can Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Torts . . . . There is a commander-
in-chief, and his name is Bohlen.”51 Prosser could not, of course, have known 
that he would later be both war-correspondent and commander-in-chief, both 
rabble-rousing and leading the army too. But once he had gained these roles, he 
certainly made the best of them. 
As masterful battleground strategist and master storyteller, Prosser gave his 
reports from the frontline a heady verve unlike other legal prose of the time. 
“Prosser’s practice in describing an area of Torts was to produce a textual nar-
rative, succinct and vividly written, setting forth central features of the area.”52 
Such a practice seeks to suppress difference as a means of constructing not only 
consensus, but narrative coherence. That which does not advance the story in 
the desired way is simply left out. It was imperative that the thrust of narrative 
be kept aimed at its ultimate goal—depicting the triumph of his army as a fait 
accompli. To acknowledge that he argued for what the law should be, instead 
of stating what the law already was, would have been to concede away his most 
important source of authority: his footnotes. Viewed as a legitimation strategy, 
the apparent thoroughness of Prosser’s research built consensus by claiming 
that a consensus already existed. That was the strategy of Prosser’s “compendi-
ous footnotes, which, if examined, revealed his classifications [were] far more 
preliminary than they seemed.”53 The footnotes in both number and variety 
were the equivalent of a fusillade unleashed to overwhelm resistance before the 
final onslaught. 
In addition to the apparent authority provided by footnotes, the tone of tri-
umphalism in Prosser’s narrative is just as important. By offering up his legal 
research and analysis as military history, he could not only depict the progress 
as the result of battles won, with each court decision a kind of victory, he could 
depict jurists as conquering generals, leading a fight on behalf of consumers 
seeking justice. This depiction of the fight was, as a result, essentially propa-
ganda, much like the stories of heroic battles fought to victory that Prosser must 
have read as a child, all casting empire-building as both inevitable and justified. 
                                                        
51  Robinette, supra note 32, at 601 (quoting William L. Prosser, Book Review, 19 MINN. L. 
REV. 257, 257). Robinette questions whether there is irony in what he supposed might have 
been Prosser’s criticism of an attempt to use the writing of a “treatise [as] ‘an exposition of a 
theory, rather than a disquisition on the law as it stands,’ ” and the parallel use of the Re-
statement of Torts “to shape the law, rather than ‘restate’ it.” Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, 
Book Review, 19 MINN. L. REV. 257, 259). I do not believe that there is any irony to be 
found here. Prosser was probably voicing a criticism of the substance of Harper and 
Bohlen’s rethinking of the law of torts, but not the technique, which he plainly went on to 
use himself, and use much more successfully. 
52  WHITE, supra note 29, at 161. White also points to Prosser’s use of a multitude of foot-
notes and citations to “supporting” cases to add credence to his synthesis of rules and catego-
ries “that purported to summarize the ‘state of the law.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). 
53  Id. at 177. 
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Victory was itself the proof of rightness, making any needed sacrifice both no-
ble and necessary. 
To achieve victory, however, there must be an enemy to overcome. And 
here the enemy was contract law, with tort law to act as liberating army. When 
victory came, Prosser depicted it as a violent, bloody adventure. 
There is a final heavy bombardment; the assault goes forward against the main 
breach, and the storming party ascends over the corpses of the slain. There is a 
desperate hour of hand-to-hand combat, and then the moment when the defense 
falters. The line wavers; the break becomes a retreat, the retreat a rout. The rest 
is the story of sack and slaughter, of riot, rape and rapine, that has added an evil 
luster to the names of Magdeburg and Badajoz, along with ancient Troy.54 
Not only has the citadel fallen, victors “sack and slaughter” and commit 
acts of “riot, rape and rapine”—all metaphorically, of course. But what purpose 
do such violent metaphors serve except as conscious echoes of the historic bat-
tles upon which Prosser bases his own telling? There are Prosser’s references to 
Magdeburg, a Protestant city that fell to the Holy Roman Empire and Catholic 
League during the Thirty Years War,55 and the Siege of Badajoz, one of the 
bloodiest of the Napoleonic Wars.56 And then there is mention of Troy, the ten-
year siege that ended only when the city fell after allowing in the “gift” of the 
Trojan Horse.57 All of these battles involved a protected enclave, an area held 
                                                        
54  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 791. 
55  GEORGE PAGÈS, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, 1618–1648, at 128 (David Maland & John 
Hooper trans., 1970). The sack of Magdeburg caused a breakdown in peace talks between 
the warring Catholics and Protestants. Id. (“In no time the news of the sack of Magdeburg 
had spread, and the reaction of horror which it caused now rendered impossible the . . . at-
tempts to mediate between the Catholics and Protestants.”). For a contemporaneous (and 
self-serving) letter that describes the sack, see GERHARD BENECKE, GERMANY IN THE THIRTY 
YEARS WAR 34–36 (1979) (“The enemy made several attempts to take the smaller defences 
and lost many people before finally succeeding.”). There is pointed irony, maybe unintend-
ed, in Prosser’s use of the Sack of Magdeburg as a metaphor. The laws of Magdeburg—the 
Magdeburger Recht—became the predominant basis of written law for central and eastern 
Europe between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, spreading from city to city in the form 
of a kind of model law. See BERMAN, supra note 30, at 376. It is thus no stretch to say that 
such law operated much like the Restatements did centuries later. 
56  See generally CHARLES ESDAILE, THE PENINSULAR WAR: A NEW HISTORY 369–98 (2003). 
For a description of the turning-point in which Wellington’s troops finally took the castle at 
Badajoz, vanquishing Napoleon’s troops, and the “riot, rape and rapine” that followed, see 
id. at 383–87. 
57  One can also easily detect the echoes of Virgil’s classic telling of the sack of Troy in the 
language that Prosser uses to describe the assault on the citadel. Here is a translation that 
would have been available to Prosser in his youth and early adulthood: 
Who could unfold in speech that night’s havoc? Who its carnage? or who could match our toils 
with tears? The ancient city falls, for many years a queen; in heaps lifeless corpses lie scattered 
amid the streets, amid the homes and hallowed portals of the gods. Nor do Teucrians alone pay 
penalty with their lifeblood; at times valour returns to the hearts of the vanquished also and the 
Danaan victors fall. Everywhere is cruel grief, everywhere panic, and full many a shape of 
death! 
VIRGIL, THE AENEID, Bk. II, ll. 361–69 (H. Rushton Fairclough trans., 1916). 
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by an enemy into which the armies of the other side fought for entry and con-
trol. Wellington at Badajoz sought to defeat the empire-building of Napoleon, 
while the Catholic League sought to stem the growth of Protestantism, thus 
protecting the dominance of the Catholic Church. And of course, in the Trojan 
War, they fought for the return of one stolen—Helen, spirited away from the 
King of Sparta by Paris of Troy. 
Not all of the dramatic battles that echo through Prosser’s history involved 
the clash of ideology per se; however, there was in each an empire to defend or 
expand, or a competing empire to vanquish. Having no doubt grown up reading 
adventure stories that depicted these historic battles,58 Prosser knowingly chose 
to employ martial rhetoric that rang loudly with a kind of jingoistic self-
assurance that claims empire-building as its own justification, a kind of might 
that makes right. In describing the assault on the citadel, its fall was what justi-
fied its assault; the citadel stood to be conquered, waiting for someone like 
Prosser to summon the muses to help cheer the troops, plot strategy with the 
gods, and prod his generals on to victory. And then, when the victory was 
achieved and the citadel had fallen, Prosser could tell the story, creating a mas-
ter-narrative that still is in at least partial control to this day. As has been noted, 
“[t]he pro-plaintiff revolution in products liability in the early 1960s will forev-
er be associated with heroic, martial images, epitomized in Prosser’s descrip-
tion of the assault upon, and fall of, the fortressed citadel of privity.”59 Such is 
the way of a master-narrative; it has imperialistic tendencies all its own. 
B. The Battle of Mazetti: The Bait and Switch Begins 
With the publication of Assault upon the Citadel in 1960, Prosser heralded 
the increasing number of judicial decisions in which consumers were allowed 
                                                        
58  Although there is no direct confirmation, Prosser likely read the books of George Alfred 
Henty, an exceedingly popular English writer who wrote over a hundred works of historical 
fiction that “reflected and reinforced imperial sentiments.” Patrick A. Dunae, Boys’ Litera-
ture and the Idea of Empire, 1870–1914, 24 VICTORIAN STUD. 105, 109 (1980) (arguing 
Henty was as interested in the economic aspects of imperialism as the militarily-advanced 
missionary aspects). Among the books published in the U.S. and popular during Prosser’s 
youth were two Henty novels that depicted the Thirty Years War—The Lion of the North and 
Won By the Sword, the latter of which includes the chapter, The Relief of the Citadel. See 
generally G.A. HENTY, THE LION OF THE NORTH (1886); G.A. HENTY, WON BY THE SWORD 
85–102 (1900). The Henty novel that depicted the Siege of Badajoz in the Peninsular War 
was called Under Wellington’s Command, which includes the following passage describing 
the aftermath of the siege’s success: “Here a terrible scene took place, and the British troops 
sullied their victory by the wildest and most horrible excesses. . . . Now this long-pent-up 
feeling burst out, and murder, rapine, and violence of all sorts raged for some hours wholly 
without check.” G.A. HENTY, UNDER WELLINGTON’S COMMAND 312–13 (1899). The similar-
ity with Prosser’s prose is too notable to be the result of mere coincidence. That said, Prosser 
wrote the story clearly as he saw it, as battle for control of an enclave protected by an oppos-
ing army. It thus makes sense that the stories of his youth, all so similar in adventurous 
terms, would saturate the telling here. 
59  Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 30. 
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to recover damages despite a lack of privity. To Prosser, this increase evi-
denced a kind of battle on behalf of consumers injured by defective products, 
allowing consumers to hold sellers strictly liable for product-related injury, 
which is to say, without the need to prove negligence. In telling the story of the 
battle, Prosser prominently featured food cases, discussing at length the con-
sumer-protective rationales of these cases. Yet, six years later, when he an-
nounced the dawn of the strict liability era in a follow-up article, The Fall of the 
Citadel, Prosser seemed intent on deemphasizing the import of not only the 
food cases, but food safety as well. Suddenly, the cases that had been progeni-
tors of consumer protection were mere footnotes—literally. The Washington 
Supreme Court’s historic decision in Mazetti v. Armour60 is an excellent exam-
ple of Prosser’s strategic de-emphasis of food, with food safety sacrificed to the 
needs of the battle and to obtain victory. 
In Prosser’s narration of the citadel’s fall, Mazetti v. Armour is briefly de-
scribed as the “very first case which threw overboard the bar of privity.”61 This 
case had been cast as a different character in the narration of the citadel’s as-
sault, where it was described as the case that “led off” in making “a change in 
the law of food liability.”62 At another point in The Assault, without identifying 
the case by name (except in a footnote lacking parenthetical explanation), 
Prosser cites to Mazetti in support of his assertion that “[s]trict liability also has 
been applied to permit the retailer to recover from the manufacturer for his pe-
cuniary loss when indignant customers return the goods and spread the word.”63 
The only other citation to Mazetti appears in a lengthy footnote that borrows 
“with appreciation” from another law review article, allowing Prosser to trum-
                                                        
60  Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913). 
61  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 821–22 & n.165 (noting further that, as a result of 
overthrowing the bar of privity, the case “allowed recovery to the owner of a restaurant for 
his loss of business when he served bad food to his customers”). The case name is not men-
tioned in the text, only in the accompanying footnote. Id. at 822 n.165. 
62  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1106 & n.42. 
63  Id. at 1142–43 & n.262. In the same note, Prosser also cited Southwest Ice & Dairy 
Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 220 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1950) (affirming judgment in favor of gro-
cers who lost money after a customer found a mouse in a bottle of milk). For purpose of the 
story he was telling, this particular issue—whether damages for economic loss were recover-
able in tort—was not too important, and it was not mentioned again. This lack of mention is 
perhaps not surprising in that the facts of Mazetti provide an example of how a plaintiff 
might recover from a restaurant for serving bad food and, in turn, the restaurant could sue the 
distributor and manufacturer for its own damages. Far from being a “circuity of action” that 
delayed the plaintiff’s recovery and interfered with a redistribution of costs, Mazetti could 
stand for the efficiency of a warranty approach to the problem. Cf. K.N. Llewellyn, On War-
ranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699, 717 & n.56 (1936) (citing Mazetti as 
one of two examples where a court allowed recovery for loss of customers and reputation 
based on a middleman having provided the seller with unsound wares). Llewellyn quite 
rightly points out that, unless courts recognize and enforce the “responsibility of a middle-
man for hidden defects in goods,” then “what pressure the law exerts is all in the direction of 
encouraging sales of unsound wares to those middlemen who were becoming daily more 
numerous.” Id. 
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pet the twenty-nine “triumphs of juridical technique” where courts had cleverly 
come up with a way to allow the plaintiffs to recover under an implied warranty 
theory, despite the lack of privity.64 
In the text of Prosser’s footnote, Mazetti is said to stand for the proposition 
that “[f]ood cases are a special exception to the privity rule, and a law unto 
themselves.”65 Interestingly, the article from which Prosser borrows states only 
that “[f]ood cases are a special exception to the privity rule.”66 Prosser added 
the “law unto themselves” part, and did so appropriately, given that the rules 
were very much food-specific. The addition was likely more tactical, though, 
because it occurred during the run-up to the adoption of the first version of Sec-
tion 402A, which was, at that point, specific to the sellers of defective food. It 
thus makes sense that he decided to add this gloss on Mazetti to better support 
his need to assert “that the law of the future is that of strict liability for food.”67 
By the time of the publication of The Fall, however, Prosser had already set his 
sights higher—on strict liability for all products. There was, as a result, no 
more reason to depict food cases as “a law unto themselves.” Instead, food is 
now to be switched out, having served successfully as bait. We can see this 
switch begin to take place when, in The Fall of the Citadel, Prosser announces 
that “strict liability in tort divorced from any contract rules . . . is the law of the 
immediate and the distant future.”68 Thus, according to Prosser, food no longer 
merited a law unto itself, despite his earlier comment; the future was about 
strict liability for all products, not just food. The switch was well underway, 
with no need any more for a special rule for food. 
Notice, for example, the dismissive tone used when Prosser speaks of the 
“prolonged and violent national agitation over defective food, which at times 
almost reached a pitch of hysteria.”69 Although Prosser begrudgingly concedes 
that the “upshot” of the widespread concern for food quality was the passage of 
the Federal Food and Drug Act, he plainly is unimpressed by regulation as a 
possible response to the problem of product safety.70 Still, as a master storytell-
                                                        
64  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1124 & n.153 (borrowing all of the examples “with 
appreciation” from Gillam, supra note 17, at 153–55). 
65  Id. at 1125 n.153. 
66  Gillam, supra note 17, at 154. 
67  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1110. 
68  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 804; see also Tentative Draft No. 10, supra note 25, 
§ 402A note to Institute (“[I]t has become quite evident that this is the law of the immediate 
future.”). 
69  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1104–05 (footnote omitted). In contrast, others at 
the time argued in favor of both regulation and litigation to improve food safety. See, e.g., 
Dickerson, supra note 29, at 590 (arguing that lawsuits combined with government regula-
tion was the best approach). 
70  See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1106. He was similarly unimpressed with The 
Jungle as literature. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). I have always loved 
the fact that, in The Assault upon the Citadel, Prosser could not resist the urge to include a 
brief review in which he expresses his full-throated dislike of Sinclair’s novel by calling it 
“trash.” Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1105 n.40 (“After rereading The Jungle, the 
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er, he knew the importance of stage-setting, and he was more than happy to 
note that the “time and public sentiment were ripe for a change in the law of 
food liability.”71 It was just that the change in the law that he envisioned was a 
change in tort law, not regulation, and a change that would make it easier for 
consumers to sue and recover damages.72 
The other likely reason that Prosser downplayed the significance of Mazetti 
and the other food cases that preceded and followed it is that these cases moved 
the battle line forward, but not dramatically enough. In one of the more oft-
quoted passages, the court states, “[r]emedies of injured consumers ought not to 
be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation of 
the manufacturer should not be based alone on privity of contract. It should 
rest, as was once said, upon the demands of social justice.”73 But rather than 
reject a contract-based remedy entirely, in favor of a remedy solely in tort, Ma-
zetti adopted the idea that food carries the warranty with it such that it “is avail-
able to all who may be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate chan-
nels of trade.”74 Instead of tossing warranty overboard along with privity, the 
Mazetti court refashioned the law of warranty to better address the special im-
portance of food. 
The idea that there could be a warranty that somehow tagged along with 
the product was an idea that Prosser begrudgingly described as ingenious. For 
                                                                                                                                
writer cannot refrain from expressing his opinion as to how bad a piece of literature it is.”). 
Not satisfied with this broadside, he also quotes a highly amusing summary in which Sin-
clair’s writing style is parodied. Id. (citing FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY: NOW AND 
FOREVER 236 (Academic Reprints 1954)). Prosser also refers to The Jungle as “a minor Un-
cle Tom’s Cabin of the war against bad food.” Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1106. 
The author Jack London is reportedly the first to have compared Sinclair’s novel with the 
(in)famous work by Harriet Beecher Stowe. See Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The 
Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2413 
n.2 (2001). If focused solely on the impact of The Jungle in prompting and focusing public 
reaction, then I would say that the comparison is defensible. Comparing practices of the meat 
industry at the turn of the century to slavery is not defensible. For other articles that use The 
Jungle as a convenient touchstone for a discussion of food safety, see Denis Stearns, 
Preempting Food Safety: An Examination of USDA Rulemaking and Its E. coli O157:H7 
Policy in Light of Estate of Kriefall ex rel. Kriefall v. Excel Corporation, 1 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 375, 388 n.66 (2005). 
71  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1106. 
72  But see Dickerson, supra note 29, at 590 (arguing that lawsuits combined with govern-
ment regulation was the best approach). Of course, research since Prosser’s time has demon-
strated that lawsuits are an extremely weak incentive for food safety. JEAN C. BUZBY, ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. ECON. REP. NO. 799, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MICROBIAL 
FOODBORNE ILLNESS 24 (2001) (“[H]igh transaction and information costs combined with the 
structure of the legal system limit the effectiveness of the litigation for compensating ill con-
sumers and providing firms with signals to produce safer food.”). In addition, one only needs 
a lawsuit after having eaten food that was, in fact, not safe. Advocating for lawsuits over 
regulation is, by definition, a position that accepts the continued prevalence of adulteration 
and turns consumers into involuntary test-subjects. 
73  Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 (Wash. 1913) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
74  Id. at 636. 
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him, however, it was tactical ingenuity for having managed to open a break in 
the citadel’s wall. The tone Prosser uses in describing the state of the battle at 
that point is hardly more than one of strained patience. 
None of the three decisions [Mazetti and two that followed it] gave much in the 
way of reasons for the strict liability to the consumer without privity, other than 
the protection of the public interest, and an “implied representation” that the 
food was safe. As other jurisdictions followed suit, and the cases began to multi-
ply, there was a period in the twenties in which the courts labored hard to evolve 
a great many highly ingenious theories to justify the rule, such as fictitious 
agencies or third-party-beneficiary contracts. In 1927 the Mississippi court came 
up with the idea of a “warranty” running with the goods from the manufacturer 
to the consumer, by analogy to a covenant running with the land. This found 
general, although perhaps undeserved, acceptance, and nearly all of the later 
cases have adopted some theory of “warranty.”75 
Prosser does not explain why the acceptance is undeserved, but his point is 
clear. Any theory based on a warranty did not deserve acceptance. Still, it was a 
means to an end, convincing Prosser to hold his nose and bear for a little longer 
the law of warranty being in power. 
Ultimately, what was most important to Prosser was that Mazetti can be 
called a strict liability case (as he was then defining it), and that liability was 
imposed without the need to prove negligence, and in the absence of any privity 
between the parties. This was the form of the action that Prosser championed; it 
was just that it was still in the hands of the wrong army, with the wrong regime 
still in control.76 You can almost hear Prosser emit a melancholy sigh when he 
writes “the theory which finally emerged and won the day was that of an im-
plied ‘warranty,’ either running with the goods to the consumer or made direct-
ly to him; and in the last decade warranty is virtually the only theory which has 
appeared in the decisions.”77 Courts had, in Prosser’s view, made a category-
mistake, relying on “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and 
contract.”78 Until the remedy was solely in tort, the assault must continue 
apace.  
                                                        
75  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1106 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
76  Owen is the only tort scholar I found who is somewhat critical of Prosser’s use of the Ma-
zetti case. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 36, at 190 n.10 (“The breakdown of the privity de-
fense is recounted in Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel.”). For example, he rightly ques-
tions whether Mazetti is the first case to have allowed a third-party to recover in the absence 
of privity. See id. at 258 n.18 (“[Y]et Mazetti relies on earlier cases which suggests an even 
earlier origin of this principle.”). The Mazetti court cites a number of “recent cases holding 
that the ultimate consumer may bring his action direct against the manufacturer” of an unsafe 
food product. Mazetti, 135 P. at 634. What Mazetti actually was the first to do was “allowing 
a retailer of the goods to sue direct and recover for injury to his business and loss of reputa-
tion,” despite lacking privity. Id. 
77  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1126. 
78  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 800. Prosser first used this phrase in Assault upon the 
Citadel, followed by the quotation that appears to have inspired the phrase. See Prosser, The 
Assault, supra note 1, at 1126. 
15 NEV. L.J. 106 - STEARNS.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:58 PM 
Fall 2014] PROSSER’S BAIT-AND-SWITCH 125 
C. Vanquishing Warranty: The Bait and Switch Completed 
The story that Prosser tells of how Cardozo finally vanquished, once and 
for all, the rule of privity, has been recounted so many times that the most in-
dustrious of scribes would have difficulty cataloguing them all.79 In Prosser’s 
“tale of the storming of the heights of negligence,” Cardozo is said to be 
“wielding a mighty axe,” when he “burst over the ramparts, and buried the gen-
eral rule under the exception.”80 This depiction of Cardozo is almost certainly 
modeled on Pyrrhus busting open the door to Priam’s inner citadel in the sack 
of Troy, given that Prosser later makes explicit reference to Troy in The Fall of 
the Citadel.81 But Pyrrhus was there to exact bloody revenge, an act that does 
not at first glance (or second or third) seem to pair with what Cardozo is said to 
have accomplished in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.—the definitive over-
throw of the rule of privity in product-related negligence claims—even if all 
agree that accomplishment was historic.82 The metaphoric pairing of Cardozo 
                                                        
79  Even Prosser, certainly one the most industrious of scribes, thought the story had, over 
fifty years ago, “been told too often for any need to repeat it.” Prosser, The Assault, supra 
note 1, at 1099. Of course, Prosser could not help himself and, thus, still gifted us with the 
following one-sentence summary—more like a movie-pitch, really—of the case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916): “In 1916 there came the phenome-
non of the improvident Scot who squandered his gold upon a Buick, and so left his name 
forever imprinted upon the law of products liability.” Id. at 1100. For a detailed and pains-
takingly researched factual account of the facts of the case, including an account of the law-
suit, see generally Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the 
Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2005). Although not dis-
proving that he was an “improvident Scot,” Clarke does share the interesting detail that 
MacPherson was “a stone cutter who specialized in making grave stones” and his injuries 
left him unable to “perform his work . . . as he lacked the strength to grip his tools.” Id. at 2. 
For the best explication of Cardozo’s reasoning in the case (and a favorite recent article of 
mine), see generally Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurispru-
dence), 100 GEO. L.J. 865 (2012) (providing a persuasive and beautifully written critique of 
Dworkin’s use of MacPherson as an example of “judges writ[ing] their opinions as if they 
are discovering the right answer as a matter of law”). See also EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9–21 (1949) (using the MacPherson case as an exam-
ple of how legal concepts arise, evolve, and are displaced). 
80  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1099–100. See also Croley & Hanson, supra note 
30, at 697 (“In 1916, Judge Cardozo mounted a landmark assault upon the privity rule.”). 
81  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 791. In Aeneid’s telling of the Sack of Troy, Pyrrhus 
is described as breaking into the inner citadel in pursuit of Priam, the King of Troy, who Pyr-
rhus has come to slay to revenge the death of his own father, Achilles. The scene with Pyr-
rhus (who should not be confused with the later Pyrrhus of Epirus, he of the “pyrrhic victo-
ry”) is described as follows in a translation of Prosser’s time: 
Pyrrhus himself among the foremost grasps a battle-axe, bursts through the stubborn gateway, 
and from their hinge tears the brass-bound doors; and now, heaving out a panel, he has breached 
the solid oak and made a huge wide-mouthed gap. Open to view is the house within, and the 
long halls are bared; open to view are the inner chambers of Priam and the kings of old, and 
armed men are seen standing at the very threshold. 
VIRGIL, supra note 57, at ll. 479–85. 
82  See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998) (arguing that tort scholars, Prosser especially, have treated 
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and Pyrrhus makes sense, though, to Prosser, a tort partisan keen to depict the 
overruling of the rule of privity as not only a defeat for the law of warranty, but 
also as an act of revenge. 
For Prosser, MacPherson not only provided a place from which to launch 
new battles, it also provided a rallying cry that would spur jurists on to success-
fully expand the frontlines of battle. Thus, according to Prosser, “[d]uring the 
suceeding [sic] years this decision swept the country” and its rule “extended by 
degrees.”83 It was precisely this extension that Prosser must have had in mind 
for strict liability in tort, which he and his compatriots also hoped would sweep 
the country. First, though, the battle to have strict liability apply to food sales 
needed to be won. 
According to Prosser, while the “battle over negligence . . . was still hang-
ing in the balance, the assault began upon another wing, against the fortress of 
strict liability. In the beginning, it was directed against a narrow segment of the 
wall, defended only by the sellers of food and drink.”84 Such sellers might not 
have seemed like adversaries worthy of respect or fear, but “[f]or a long time 
the battlements held firm against all the raiding parties,” and this forced “writ-
ers here and there . . . to direct their shafts at other parts of the wall, and to cry 
for an extension of the strict liability to products other than food.”85 In sum, the 
overthrow of privity was not enough, and neither was the application of strict 
liability to unsafe food. For victory to be total, and for tort’s empire to achieve 
its manifest destiny, tort must control all products, not just food. To get there, 
however, there was still the law of warranty to be fully surmounted, something 
that did not occur even when the citadel was said to have fallen. 
Prosser begins the second part of his battle history by announcing the fall 
of the citadel and the date: May 9, 1960.86 It was on this date that the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court issued Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, a decision in 
which the rule of strict liability—liability without the need for a proof of negli-
gence—was said to have been born.87 As Prosser’s compatriot Keeton later put 
it, Henningsen “render[ed] an almost mortal blow to the notion that fault is a 
prerequisite to recovery for physical harm to users and consumers who are not 
parties to any contract.”88 And the weapon used to render this blow was once 
                                                                                                                                
MacPherson as the overruling of Winterbottom v. Wright—the precedent formerly requiring 
privity for recovery—to advance a view of tort liability that is not governed by duty as an 
autonomous or determinative basis for the imposition of liability). 
83  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1100. 
84  Id. at 1103. 
85  Id. at 1110. 
86  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 791. 
87  Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
88  Page Keeton, Manufacturer’s Liability: The Meaning of “Defect” in the Manufacture and 
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 560 (1969) (pointing out that under Mac-
Pherson the plaintiff who lacked privity still had to prove negligence). This point is stated 
quite differently in Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, the edition published after 
Prosser’s death, and under the general editorship of Keeton. There it was stated that: 
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again food. Or as Prosser explains, with Henningsen, “Now the special rule as 
to food and drink was expanded to engulf the rest.”89 He then quotes one of the 
most famous passages from Henningsen decision. 
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle 
of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may bring 
illness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the 
driver, occupants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier 
of privity.90 
Yet, in rejecting the legal significance of any difference between food and 
an automobile, the court concludes by quoting from a case that is likely to be 
familiar to the reader of this article. “Under modern conditions . . . remedies . . . 
should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation of the 
manufacturer should not be based alone on privity of contract. It should rest, as 
was once said, upon ‘the demands of social justice.’ ”91 
Thus did a case that involved canned tongue gone bad—Mazetti v. Armour 
& Co.—provide the rationale for applying strict liability to an automobile.92 
Despite all of their successes, especially in battling back a resurgent con-
tract army and its new weapon, the warranty disclaimer, the tort armies did not 
seem that joyous. Perhaps the dampened mood came from the top. The trouble 
was still warranty, that treasonous bastard that got its start in tort but then had 
defected to contract.93 Or as Prosser had put it in one of his earlier reports from 
the battlefield, quoting an unknown author, “A more notable example of legal 
miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which produced the modern ac-
tion for breach of warranty.”94 Prosser quotes this observation with obvious ap-
                                                                                                                                
In the celebrated case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the only evidence required for 
recovery . . . was the testimony of the driver . . . . This was regarded as sufficient evidence from 
which to infer that a “flaw” was present and attributable to a miscarriage in the construction pro-
cess, albeit it was regarded as insufficient to infer negligence. 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 695 (5th ed. 1984) 
(footnote omitted). 
89  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 793. 
90  Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 83. 
91  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
92  See supra Part I.B. 
93  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1126 (“ ‘Originally sounding in tort, yet arising out 
of the warrantor’s consent to be bound, [warranty] later ceased necessarily to be consensual, 
and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract.’ ” (quoting Note, Necessity for Privity of 
Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HARV. L. REV. 414, 414–15 (1929)) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
94  Id. (quoting Note, Necessity for Privity of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 
HARV. L. REV. 414, 414 (1929)). After concisely surveying the development and recent ap-
plication of “modern” warranty actions, the author of this note strongly defends the imposi-
tion of liability based on a theory of “warranty by representation.” Note, Necessity for Privity 
of Contract in Warranties by Representation, 42 HARV. L. REV. 414, 417 (1929) (“in a prac-
tical world there should be no magic in the metaphysics of privity of contract”). Not surpris-
ingly (to me), the author’s defense is then based primarily on the example of food-selling. Id. 
at 416. The author writes as follows: 
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proval, echoing his own characterization of warranty as “a freak hybrid born of 
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.”95 And, of course, it is no surprise 
that the solution that Prosser proposed was to vanquish that “freak” warranty 
once and for all, achieving a kind of revenge that he had long championed. For 
example, in the second edition of his torts treatise, Prosser wrote: 
[I]t seems better to discard the troublesome sales concept of “warranty,” and im-
pose strict liability outright in tort, as a pure matter of social policy. It is “only 
by some violent pounding and twisting” that warranty can be made to yield the 
desired result. . . . “The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to 
depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.” If the producer is to be required 
to guarantee his product, no further justification will be needed than that public 
opinion will have arrived at the point where it places full responsibility for the 
injury upon him.96 
For Prosser, “social policy” demanded that it be left for tort alone to govern 
anything product-related where a “consumer” was involved, and that the sooner 
this government gained power, the better. 
What stood in the way of such a government gaining power was not a lack 
of judicial support for a form of strict liability; it was that the support remained 
agnostic about the role of warranty. There was wide acceptance still of a rule of 
strict liability specific to food, which Llewellyn had early recognized as the 
“point from which the whole line of civil protection of the uninformed consum-
                                                                                                                                
Where a vendor, for example a dealer in foodstuffs, makes a sale directly to a consumer, there is 
ordinarily an implied warranty of quality. To hold to a less strict accounting a restaurant-keeper, 
who prepares and serves food on the premises, is patently inconsistent, whether or not such ser-
vice constitutes a sale. Privity of contract exists, if not privity of sale. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). The logic here plainly echoes that of the Mazetti decision. 
95  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1126. Although Karl Llewellyn had used somewhat 
similar language, he did so in making a point that is significantly more nuanced and insight-
ful. In particular, Llewellyn was plainly less bothered by the overlap in contract and tort, and 
more focused on how each area of the law might best be suited for the protection of consum-
ers. 
What needs to be insisted upon is that “contract” is in this a bastard by accounting out of tort, 
and, like each of its parents, needs dealing with according to its social uses. Accounting drives 
toward making deals mean deals, to keep books straight. Tort drives toward making losses rest 
where they can best be first reduced, and then spread. Total exemption or too great cutting down 
of remedy by “contracting,” without regard for the tort phases of the risks in hand, is over-
domination by an illegitimate father. 
K.N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 402 
(1937). While here Llewellyn criticizes the over-domination of contract law—the army on 
whose side he nominally fought —Prosser sought the domination of tort law to the exclusion 
of all contract concerns. That such an approach would inevitably create a counter-revolt in 
favor of commercial concerns could only have been ignored by one in the fog of war. 
96  WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 510–11 (2d ed. 1955) (footnotes 
omitted). For those paying close attention, it was likely noted that the language in quotation 
marks was that also quoted by the court in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 (Wash. 
1913). 
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er branches out.”97 Courts had located the source of liability in a promise that 
food was suitable for consumption, a promise that food was capable of making 
on its own as food—that being the nature of food.98 Unlike any other manufac-
tured product, food demands of the eater a level of trust that traces back to the 
assumption of its safe-making and the unquestioned existence of a safe-
maker.99 As the court in Mazetti pointed out, food is not “susceptible to practi-
cal test, except the test of eating.”100 Nothing demonstrates reliance more than 
eating. 
But the fact of this reliance inherent in the nature of food and its marketing 
is something that Prosser not only tried to ignore, but sought to actively dis-
count. Given his goals for strict liability in tort, as applied to all products, he 
had no choice. Otherwise, a warranty specific to food was likely to have con-
tinued appeal and, thus, risk gaining consensus-support. In seeking to discount 
the validity of a warranty of quality for food, Prosser launched two separate at-
tacks. The first attack was based on the stated need for the consumer to possess 
actual knowledge of the entity that made and sold the food product. According-
ly, Prosser points out that a “husband or guest who eats a plate of beans seldom 
asks the housewife whose product they are, and still less often at what store she 
bought them.”101 According to Prosser, the reliance has nothing to do with the 
                                                        
97  Llewellyn, supra note 63, at 704 n.14; see also Clutterbuck, supra note 37, at 1136 (quot-
ing this same passage, as well as pointing out that Llewellyn had, in a comment written 
while he was a law student, “argued for the extension of protection to all consumers of food-
stuffs and not just to commercial buyers, but hedged somewhat, only hinting that imposition 
of ‘the liability of an insurer’ upon sellers might be the preferred policy”) (citing Comment, 
Tort and Contract in the Marketing of Food, 27 YALE L.J. 1068, 1073 & n.21 (1918)). Clut-
terbuck makes a persuasive argument that Llewellyn’s contributions to the developing theo-
ries of enterprise liability had “too frequently been overlooked.” Id. at 1131. 
98  See Stearns, supra note 7, at 434 (arguing that because food always carries with it a trace 
of the face-to-face relationship that first introduced food as that which can be trusted, all 
food “promises—or appears to promise—that the food was made with care sufficient to pro-
vide me with something to eat that will sustain me, not kill me.”). 
99  Id. 
100  Mazetti, 135 P. at 635–36 (observing also that there is, for the same reasons, no basis for 
applying the doctrine of caveat emptor). 
101  Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1128. Notice how it is, of course, the housewife 
who both purchased and prepared the beans for the husband and the guest. But Prosser then 
continues his point, pushing it well past the point of ridiculousness, asserting that “[e]ven the 
purchaser at retail who eats the beans himself may be ignorant of the brand he buys, or utter-
ly indifferent to it.” Id. Despite my inability to imagine any set of facts that would satisfy 
Prosser’s hypothetical here, it is once again the legerdemain of his footnotes and citations 
there that is truly astounding. The footnote is as follows: 
Thus in Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952), the buyer of a 
bottle of linament [sic] with an express warranty on the label was denied recovery against the 
manufacturer, because he paid no attention to it at the time of purchase. Accord, Dobbin v. Pa-
cific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhen-
ke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941); Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F. 2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955). 
Compare Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705 (D. Colo. 1954). 
Id. at 1128 n.169. In Randall, there is no food at issue, and the court says that the “plaintiffs 
withdrew as an issue in the case any question of liability arising out of or under an implied 
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food really, and everything to do with knowing the identity of the manufactur-
er. Why this must be so, Prosser never explains. But then, no one ever really 
asked him either, because the success of his argument here went largely un-
questioned.102 
The second attack on warranty was launched from a point similar to that of 
the unknown manufacturer. In this attack, the manufacturer is known but be-
yond the reach of a lawsuit, which means that the retailer must be held strictly 
                                                                                                                                
warranty.” Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 54 N.W.2d 769, 770 (Minn. 1952). Moreover, 
the court reversed the judgment for the defendant and granted the plaintiffs a new trial “in 
the interests of justice . . . [in order] that a determination may be had on some theory free 
from the ambiguities existing in the instructions under consideration.” Id. at 771. Had 
Prosser wanted to cite to a case that fit the facts of his hypothetical, there was certainly one 
available. See generally Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382 (Iowa 1920) (re-
versing directed verdict for the defendant and allowing the plaintiffs to proceed to trial for 
breach of express and implied warranty and negligence claims for personal injury and death 
caused by adulterated beans purchased from retailer). In fact, citing Davis elsewhere in the 
article, Prosser describes the court’s holding as follows: “The manufacturer’s marketing of 
the goods is in itself a representation to the consumer that they are fit to buy.” Prosser, The 
Assault, supra note 1, at 1124 n.153; see also id. at 1107 n.51, 1142 n.258 (citing Davis in 
support of there being strict liability for food). 
 The cases that Prosser cites as being in “accord” are no better, being neither in accord 
with the hypothetical in the text, nor with the decision in Randall. See Torpey v. Red Owl 
Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117, 117–19, 121 (8th Cir. 1955) (sustaining a directed verdict dis-
missing implied warranty claims, solely on the grounds of lack of privity where sister of the 
purchaser at a self-serve retailer was injured by a jar of applesauce that broke when she at-
tempted to reseal it); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598, 600–01 (9th Cir. 
1941) (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to properly plead an implied warranty claim, and 
that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove that retailer should have known that hot 
water bottle would leak); Dobbin v. Pac. Coast Coal Co., 170 P.2d 642, 647, 651 (Wash. 
1946) (holding that there was insufficient evidence that a furnace system was of such “faulty 
design” that the defendant “has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article”). Fi-
nally, the case that is preceded by the compare signal is comparable in only the most ambig-
uous sense of that word. See Senter v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 127 F. Supp. 705, 708, 710 (D. 
Colo. 1954) (reversing recovery under negligence theory based on insufficient evidence, 
while allowing one of the two plaintiffs to recover for breach of express warranty where 
privity of contract existed; the plaintiff lacking privity could have no recovery). In short, 
Prosser’s footnotes are also examples of a kind of repeated bait-and-switch, where the au-
thority cited in support of one thing is swapped out so that it can support something entirely 
different. 
102  Despite what I see as a complete lack of evidence for an “unknown manufacturer” prob-
lem, subsequent commentators have been remarkably uncritical in accepting Prosser’s asser-
tions here as true, even when displaying considerable skepticism to other aspects of Prosser’s 
project. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 29, at 171 (“Where negligence theory proved most in-
adequate was in insuring that an injured plaintiff would be able to identify the defendant ac-
countable for his injuries.”). Yet, that which was identified as a serious fault with a negli-
gence-based approach disappears when it comes time to assess the efficacy of strict liability 
in insuring compensation. See id. (“A shift to strict liability in defective products cases 
meant that consumers could identify manufacturers as prospective defendants and that manu-
facturers could assume that anytime their products were defective and used in an ordinary 
manner, they would have to pay for the injuries the products caused.”). Apparently it is only 
under a negligence regime that manufacturers are impossibly difficult to identify, but under 
strict liability that difficulty disappears entirely. 
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liable if the consumer is to recover. And, of course, if your goal is to make sure 
that an injured consumer is compensated, this concern cannot be ignored. On 
the other hand, is such a concern actually real? Prosser baldly asserts that 
“[t]here are enough cases in which the manufacturer is beyond the jurisdiction 
. . . to justify requiring the dealer to assume the responsibility, and argue out 
with the manufacturer any questions as to their respective liability.”103 But this 
assertion is not only bald, it is untenable.104 Prosser offers no evidence that, in 
the typical product case, a plaintiff would be unable to recover from a manufac-
turer so long as there was no bar of privity. To Prosser, this seemed to be beside 
the point; to apply strict liability in tort to the entire chain of distribution—
which is what he proposed—contract law needed to be displaced in its entirety 
in favor of tort.105 Fortunately for the war effort, which had been going on for a 
long time now, Prosser’s very best general, Roger Traynor, was about to lead 
the army to its final victory at last. 
                                                        
103  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 816 (emphasis added). 
104  For the “beyond the jurisdiction” assertion, Prosser cites to the same case he relied upon 
in The Assault upon the Citadel. Compare id. at 816 n.131 (citing Burkhardt v. Armour & 
Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932)), with Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1116 
n.125 (also citing Burkhardt). Both citations include but a brief description of the case-facts, 
which involved “the actual packer of corned beef” and “the first buyer a subsidiary corpora-
tion” being in Argentina, while “the primary distributor who put his name on the can [was] 
in Illinois, and the retailer, the purchaser, and the consumer [were] in Connecticut.” Prosser, 
The Fall, supra note 16, at 816 n.131. The description in The Assault is identical except that 
it calls the purchaser “the retail buyer” and the consumer “the injured consumer.” Prosser, 
The Assault, supra note 1, at 1116 n.125. Prosser’s assertion and its “supporting” citation 
seems like nothing more than further sleight-of-hand. As Prosser must have understood, un-
der these facts the defendant Armour would have been treated as the manufacturer of the 
product by virtue of its putting its name on the label, according to the “apparent manufactur-
er doctrine.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) (“One who puts out as his 
own product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he 
were its manufacturer.”). As for the two cases cited as examples of plaintiffs not knowing 
the identity of the manufacturer, one is ambiguous and the other is inapposite. In Comarow 
v. Levy, a per curiam judgment against defendant-bottlers is reversed for there being “no 
proof that the particular bottle which exploded was bottled by the said defendants.” 115 
N.Y.S.2d 873, 873 (N.Y. App. Term 1952). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs still recovered as 
against another defendant, but the grounds are not explained. Id. at 874. Finally, in Baum v. 
Murray, the plaintiffs recovered as against the “manufacturer-retailer” for the sale of cooked 
sausages that contained trichinosis. Baum v. Murray, 162 P.2d 801, 802, 805 (Wash. 1945). 
In short, the cases cited do not provide Prosser any support for the broad assertions that he is 
making. 
105  This displacement of contract law, especially as set forth in Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to govern the sale of goods among merchants, comes in for particularly 
pointed criticism in an excellent law review article by Reed Dickerson. See generally Reed 
Dickerson, Was Prosser’s Folly Also Traynor’s? or Should the Judge’s Monument Be 
Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974). When it comes to food and the 
law, in my view, Dickerson was right as much as Prosser was wrong, and I am thus puzzled 
that Dickerson does not seem to be much discussed these days. 
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D. Charges of the Traynor Brigade: On to the Final Victory 
It seems that generals deemed great by history, which is to say those 
deemed so in the telling of their stories, all suffered early in their careers a sig-
nificant defeat, or at least an interesting setback that can provide the base for 
later fame. If we imagine Roger Traynor as the general who led one of the main 
brigades attacking the citadel, then Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company106 
could be imagined as his first loss on the battlefield (or at least a non-win), a 
case in which he had attempted, but failed, to convince his fellow justices to 
adopt a rule of strict liability for defective products. 
The Escola decision issued a little less than four years from the day of 
Traynor’s appointment to the California Supreme Court.107 In his famous con-
curring opinion, Traynor stated his belief that: 
[T]he manufacturer’s negligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of 
a plaintiff’s right to recover in cases like the present one. In my opinion it should 
now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an arti-
cle that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without in-
spection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.108 
By way of justification, Traynor argued that “[t]he consumer no longer has 
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product . . . 
and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufactur-
ers to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-
marks.”109 As social policy goes, it is certainly difficult to disagree with Tray-
nor’s argument, except perhaps for the issue of whether it was appropriately the 
province of the courts to institute such a policy. 
Years later, his defense of strict liability appears to change focus some-
what. Explaining his concurrence, Traynor criticized the means by which the 
majority reached what he considered the right result, stating that he “thought 
the court was manipulating the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to get a result that 
could be more forthrightly obtained by imposing strict liability.”110 Such criti-
cism is not difficult to defend. If the “very fact that the accident happened” can 
be deemed proof of a defect, then surely that would be the better question to go 
to the jury—Did the product contain a defect?—instead of the question of neg-
ligence—Did the manufacturer act in a negligent way? But what Traynor says 
by way of further explanation is something very different indeed: 
                                                        
106  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (holding that a waitress in-
jured by an exploding bottle of Coca Cola had produced sufficient evidence at trial to sup-
port an inference of negligence using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). 
107  J. EDWARD JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA: 
VOLUME II, 1900–1950, at 191–92 (1966). Justice Traynor was appointed on August 13, 
1940 and the Escola decision issued on July 5, 1944. 
108  Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
109  Id. at 443. 
110  Rustad, supra note 41, at 1120. 
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As I viewed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it simply presented a question of 
circumstantial evidence, and the jury was free to draw an inference of negli-
gence from the very fact that the accident happened; but the jury was also free 
not to draw the inference. . . . When the defendant made a case that couldn’t ra-
tionally be disbelieved and he completely demonstrated that there was no negli-
gence, we were nevertheless affirming judgments for the plaintiff. I was con-
vinced that those judgments should be affirmed, but it was not in the interest of 
the integrity of the judicial process to affirm them by manipulating rules. It 
would be much better to do it forthrightly and that’s what prompted my concur-
ring opinion in the Escola case, which I am told helped to get this products lia-
bility concept on the road.111 
There are two unstated premises in Traynor’s argument here, and both are 
difficult to defend. These two premises, which are corollaries of each other, are 
as follows: (1) manufacturers can “completely demonstrat[e] that there was no 
negligence” even if the plaintiff can prove that the product so manufactured 
contained a defect; and (2) the existence of a defect is not, by itself, sufficient 
to prove negligence. These two premises demonstrate that Traynor, despite pro-
testations to the contrary, remained faithful to a conception of strict liability 
without fault—that is, absolute liability. In order to defend this conception, but 
to do so without admitting to it, Traynor had to remain committed to the idea 
that a defect is not—and cannot be—proof of negligence per se. But here is the 
problem: in the food cases on which strict liability’s rationales depend, the de-
fect is, in fact, proof of negligence—that is, a lack of care in the making of the 
food. For Traynor and Prosser (and others too), this was the missed lesson of 
food. To admit that, for certain kinds of products and defects, a defect neces-
sarily is proof of negligence, would be to admit that for other kinds of products 
or defects, there is no such sufficient proof. In short, neither Prosser nor Tray-
nor were willing to admit that the kind of defect and the kind of product mat-
tered. To do so would have been to admit that there was not one rule of strict 
liability at all, and that the origin of the rule in food has supplied a rationale 
that could not be extended by analogy to all products. 
By skipping over the significance of the defect’s existence, Traynor dis-
missed out of hand the potential need for a fault-based approach to strict liabil-
ity.112 Such a dismissal was largely on theoretical grounds, driven by the desire 
of tort theorists that strict liability be a fault-free concept.113 But strict liability 
                                                        
111  Id. (emphasis added). 
112  For example, many were to find the language of Section 402A “troubling, insofar as it 
seemed to reintroduce an element of negligence to the law of strict liability.” Jung, supra 
note 45, at 864 (calling Section 402A’s language “unfortunate in one respect” and pointing 
to phrases, such as “defective condition” and “unreasonably dangerous”). 
113  See William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. 
REV. 777, 778–79 (1983) (summarizing the “reasons why the effort to purge fault from strict 
products liability has not been entirely successful,” including the fact that the primary con-
cern has been to distinguish strict products liability from warranty law). Powers goes on to 
conclude to conclude that “[f]ault is deeply embedded in the doctrinal structure of strict 
products liability itself, specifically in the concept of defectiveness.” Id. at 815. This is a 
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as a fault-free concept looks a lot like insurance, something that Traynor insists 
that it is not. 
For example, in an article published a little over two years after the deci-
sion that first adopted the rule of strict product liability, Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.,114 Traynor wrote, “It should be clear that the manufac-
turer is not an insurer for all injuries caused by his products. . . . When the inju-
ry is in no way attributable to a defect there is no basis for strict liability.”115 
Therefore, according to Traynor (and Prosser), it is the defect that provides the 
basis of liability, which means the challenge is then how to define the defect in 
a way that justifies the imposition of liability. Traynor admitted at the time that 
“as yet no definition has been formulated that would resolve all cases.”116 I am 
not sure why this was not troubling to Traynor, given that launching the rule of 
strict liability without having yet worked out a theoretical framework by which 
to define defectiveness is akin to Buick selling cars without having yet worked 
out how to keep the wheels on. Like a wheel falling off, the definitional confu-
sion surrounding issues of defectiveness is itself proof of a kind of doctrinal 
negligence. 
                                                                                                                                
conclusion with which I wholeheartedly agree, although Powers seems to believe that this is 
a bad thing, and I do not. Indeed, experienced trial attorneys will always seek to present a 
case in a way that best explains who is most blameworthy for the existence of a defect. And 
although a plaintiff is not permitted a double-recovery, and the special-verdict form submit-
ted to the jury will almost certainly contain only questions regarding the strict liability claim, 
evidence of negligence is an important means of buttressing proof of defectiveness and cau-
sation, and in “encouraging” the jury toward the higher end of the requested damage-award. 
As well, it would certainly appear that this tactic is not a new one. As far back as the four-
teenth century, negligence has been alleged even when not needed for recovery. See Morris 
S. Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in the Fourteenth-Century Law of Torts, 
128 U. PA. L. REV. 361, 367 (1979) (“[O]ne possible explanation [for proving negligence 
when it was not necessary to recovery] is that these plaintiffs thought that by emphasizing 
the negligent aspect of the defendants’ behavior, they could aggravate the wrong and in-
crease their recovery.”). It also appears that, because of “a prevailing ethic in favor of com-
pensation,” trespass actions in the fourteenth century imposed “civil liability [that] was 
strict.” Id. at 377–78. 
114  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a 
manufacturer could be held liable based upon proof that the plaintiff was injured “as a result 
of a defect in design and manufacture . . . that made the [product] unsafe for its intended 
use”). 
115  Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 
TENN. L. REV. 363, 366–67 (1965). 
116  Id. at 367, see also OWEN, supra note 36, at 344–45 (explaining how, after adoption of 
402A, courts were forced to make “fundamental distinctions” as to “different forms of prod-
uct defect”); Charles E. Cantu, A Continuing Whimsical Search for the True Meaning of the 
Term “Product” in Products Liability Litigation, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 341, 341–42 & n.3 
(2004) (noting that “what had at first seemed so simple subsequently proved to be somewhat 
complex,” while also providing examples of where “courts have attempted to distinguish 
between who is or is not a ‘seller’ ” and have “struggled over what characteristics make a 
product ‘defective’ ”); David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” 
Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 745 (1996) (“[B]eginning about the mid-
1980s, the foundations of the ‘strict’ products liability cathedral began to fracture, revealing 
large cracks in the doctrine’s underlying theoretical structure.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Strict liability worked consistently well with food cases because the defects 
were always proof of fault. Moreover, whether a product contains a manufac-
turing defect (as defective food always does), versus some other kind of a de-
fect, will determine what rationales are potentially available to justify the impo-
sition of liability, strict or not. But Greenman quickly drives by the problem, 
lumping manufacturing and design defects together as if the difference did not 
matter, thus adding further to the confusion.117 In contrast, with claims involv-
ing allegations of defective food, the defect is by definition a manufacturing 
one—that is, the food is not reasonably safe in construction. Consequently, the 
fact of the defect proves the fact of the manufacturer’s fault. 
If the Escola case got “this products liability concept on the road,” as 
Traynor observed, then in Greenman he took the car out for quite the joyride. 
But that mattered not one bit to Prosser, who was adept at glossing over  differ-
ences in the service of creating new legal doctrines. As such, he was once more 
predictably single-minded in his use of Greenman to advance his war-strategy. 
Unusually, however, Prosser seemed to underplay the import of Traynor’s deci-
sion in advancing the rule of strict liability. There was certainly no mention of 
Traynor astride a steed with sword raised in the air, charging toward contract’s 
last defenses. Even though it seemed that Greenman was the battle that won 
Prosser the war, Traynor is denied center-stage in The Fall of the Citadel.118 
No—this time, it was Prosser who “insist[ed] upon the center of the stage.”119 
As Prosser was quick to remind, he had been “perhaps the first to voice” 
the need to overthrow the warranty regime.120 There was also the need to men-
                                                        
117  Although the decision refers to a “defect in design and manufacture,” there is no evi-
dence described that the lathe contained a manufacturing defect—that is, some mistake that 
made it depart from others in that same product-line. 
Plaintiff introduced substantial evidence that his injuries were caused by defective design and 
construction of the Shopsmith. His expert witnesses testified that inadequate set screws were 
used to hold parts of the machine together so that normal vibration caused the tailstock of the 
lathe to move away from the piece of wood being turned permitting it to fly out of the lathe. 
They also testified that there were other more positive ways of fastening the parts of the machine 
together, the use of which would have prevented the accident. The jury could therefore reasona-
bly have concluded that the manufacturer negligently constructed the Shopsmith. 
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 899. 
118  There are seven or eight references to Greenman, depending on how you count them. 
The first two references are in footnotes with a few words of parenthetical information. 
Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 794 nn.10–11. One paragraph is devoted to a discussion 
of the case itself. Id. at 803–04 & nn.75 & 77–79. There is a brief textual reference at page 
830 with an accompanying footnote, this being the references that could be counted as one or 
two. Id. at 830 & n.211. The final three references are each citations in footnotes, only one of 
which has an accompanying explanation. Id. at 834 n.232 (including one sentence of explan-
atory text); id. at 835 n.238 (included in string citation); id. at 837 n.241 (citation only). 
119  Malone, supra note 48, at 1253 (“He needed attention; he seized it and, what’s more, he 
successfully held it. There are those who objected to this, or who found it painful, and not 
always without reason. But for me, Bill was a star beneficiary of that old adage, Nobody 
minds a prima donna—if she can sing! and Bill could sing.”). 
120  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 802. Inclusion of the word “perhaps” seems more 
false modesty than anything else. 
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tion—before getting to any discussion of Greenman—the adoption of Section 
402A in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a section for which he was the cre-
ator and could also take credit.121 It was only after these two announcements 
had been taken care of that Prosser finally turned his attention to Traynor’s de-
cision in Greenman, announcing: 
The effect of this decision was immediate. Other courts at once agreed that the 
proper theory was not one of warranty at all, but simply of strict liability in tort 
divorced from any contract rules. The number of them is already sufficient to 
make it reasonably certain that this is the law of the immediate and the distant 
future. There are still courts which have continued to talk the language of “war-
ranty”; but the forty-year reign of the word is ending, and it is passing quietly 
down the drain.122 
In other words, with the reign of that “freak” warranty having finally come 
to an end, slayed by Traynor and his Brigade of California justices, the Empire 
of Tort could now take control, with Prosser as Emperor for life, and the initial 
emphasis on food safety a quickly fading memory. 
II. THE ADOPTION OF SECTION 402A: FROM FOOD TO EMPIRE 
When Prosser succeeded in convincing the ALI to extend the special rule 
for food products intended for “external consumption,” his strategy was to find 
a “bridge” product from which to extend the rule even further. And for this he 
plainly had a plan. The Foreword to Tentative Draft Number 10 is telling in 
how it explains that “the Reporter and the Council are . . . satisfied that [the 
prior version of] § 402A states the scope of liability of sellers of defective 
products far too narrowly, in light of numerous, recent decisions on the subject. 
A revision of this Section is, accordingly, proposed.”123 By way of further ex-
planation, Prosser in a “Note to Institute” argued as follows: 
This Section was approved, in Tentative Draft No. 7, at the meeting in 1962. . . . 
Since 1962 there have been so many decisions extending the strict liability be-
yond products “for intimate bodily use,” that it has become quite evident that 
this is the law of the immediate future. If this Section is to be published this 
summer, . . . it will already be on the point of becoming dated. . . . [T]his is the 
most radical and spectacular development in tort law during this century.124 
                                                        
121  See id. (quoting § 402A as adopted). Of course, this mention messes up the chronology 
considerably, and definitely seems designed as another sleight-of-hand. Not only was the 
Greenman decision issued prior to the ALI’s consideration of the third draft of Section 
402A, but Prosser touts Greenman in the ALI draft materials as evidence of an ongoing 
change in the law requiring quick action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A note 
to Institute (Council Draft No. 16, Nov. 1, 1963). Thus, Greenman is, in The Fall of the Cit-
adel, presented as both a cause and effect, whereas Section 402A (and Prosser) are allowed 
center stage as the real reason for the triumph. 
122  Prosser, The Fall, supra note 16, at 804 (footnote omitted). 
123  Tentative Draft No. 10, supra note 25, § 402A foreword. 
124  Id. note to Institute. 
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But this argument was more “propaganda in favor of reform,” and little 
else.125 Prosser was warning his compatriots to not be left behind. 
To make sure that the propaganda had its desired effect, Prosser did what 
he always did; he offered up a shotgun blast of case-citations. The Reporter 
(Prosser) cites thirty-eight decisions to demonstrate the “so many decisions” 
extending strict liability, eleven of which involve automobiles and six of which 
involve airplanes.126 Of these, only ten of the decisions were issued in 1963—
that is, since the adoption of the prior version of the rule in 1962.127 A full elev-
en of the decisions cited are from before 1960, predating the first version of the 
rule, with the earliest being from 1951.128 Yet despite there being nothing even 
                                                        
125  Priest, supra note 45. 
126  Tentative Draft No. 10, supra note 25, § 402A note to Institute. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. (citing “Di Vello v. Hardner Machine Co., (1951) 46 Ohio Op. 161, 102 N.E. 2d 285 
[sic] (possibly overruled, possibly not)”). One cannot help but think that, if guileless and 
non-strategic, for the “law of the immediate future” an effort would be made to build a foun-
dation firmer than one that includes a case described as “possibly overruled, possibly not.” 
Also, the correct parallel citation is 102 N.E.2d 289. Far from being a strict liability case, Di 
Vello is a trial court ruling in which the defendant’s motion to strike a breach of warranty 
claim was denied on the grounds that the lack of privity was not a barrier to the decedent’s 
recovery. Di Vello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1951). 
Shepardizing this case reveals that no appeal was taken from the trial court’s ruling, a fact 
that calls into question the description of the case as “possibly overturned, possibly not.” In 
The Assault upon the Citadel (the source of most of the supporting material for the drafts of 
402A), Prosser describes Di Vello as a decision from a “lower court in Ohio [that] was the 
first to go beyond such articles for bodily use, and to hold the seller of a grinding wheel 
strictly liable to the user, without negligence or privity.” Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, 
at 1112 & n.103. Although there was unquestionably no privity—the decedent was an em-
ployee, and the grinder’s buyer had been the employer—negligence had been alleged, and 
was not put at issue by the motion to strike. Di Vello, 102 N.E.2d at 291. Moreover, the su-
preme court case that “apparently . . . overruled” Di Vello was nothing more than an unrelat-
ed case that held privity was required to recover on a breach of implied warranty claim. 
Prosser, The Assault, supra note 1, at 1112 & n.104 (citing Wood v. General Elec. Co., 112 
N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ohio 1953)). 
 To say that Prosser’s summary explication of the case law is misleading is, to put it 
mildly, an understatement. As already noted, White called into question to the accuracy (if 
not good faith) of Prosser’s research. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. Priest 
has more specifically challenged Prosser’s case-citations in support of the claim that there 
had been an “explosion in the law toward strict liability.” See Priest, supra note 30, at 514 & 
nn. 340–43 (noting, for example, that “[s]ix of the forty cases constitute blatant padding by 
Prosser”). Ultimately, Priest is relatively forgiving of the inaccuracy of the citations, allow-
ing that “Prosser was a scholar who possessed an acute sensitivity to budding legal trends” 
and that the “actual case law did not always develop with sufficient swiftness to verify his 
predictions.” Id. at 516. Personally, I am not so forgiving, especially when you consider how 
many actual courts cited Prosser in support of a proposition that did not, in fact, have the 
support that his citations misrepresented. Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental 
Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 653–54 
(2006) (repeating an “account (or legend)” about how Prosser’s first edition of his treatise on 
torts contained cases cited in footnotes that did not support “a variety of interesting, debata-
ble, progressive propositions about tort law,” but that the second edition changed the foot-
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approaching a groundswell of judicial support, the ALI members followed 
Prosser’s lead in adopting Section 402A. As the entry about Prosser in the Yale 
Biographical Dictionary of American Law so appropriately summarizes: 
Prosser took advantage of his multiple scholarly hats, in this case by drafting 
and pushing through the ALI a provision—Section 402A—with no counterpart 
in the First Restatement. Whether in the form specified by that provision or oth-
erwise, the idea of strict products liability soon took hold, thanks again in part to 
Prosser’s unofficial collaboration with Justice Traynor, who led the charge for it 
on his own influential court.129 
The explanation took hold, uncritically accepted as fact, that the final ver-
sion of Section 402A was adopted after the first version had shown itself to be 
“clearly too narrow,” and that the second version proved to be “quickly obso-
lete.”130 Neither of these assertions is true, nor did any one seem to care. Food 
was sacrificed in favor of the broadest rule possible. 
The final draft of Section 402A was adopted on May 25, 1963, and prom-
ulgated almost a year later on May 22, 1964.131 Born of a “desire for an orderly 
statement of our common law,”132 the ALI begat a tort law insurrection instead, 
one led by William Prosser, who was plainly intent on expanding the territory 
to explore and govern on behalf of tort scholars everywhere. He was not alone, 
of course, for other great scholars had long campaigned for strict liability, do-
ing so in a way that seems to have inspired more admiration and less criticism 
than Prosser’s efforts.133 But what seems to have also informed the battle on 
behalf of strict liability was the view that food was simply not worthy of so 
grand of a legal theory. Priest provides a perfect example of this view when he 
describes Fleming James presenting at the AALS Tort Roundtable, a presenta-
tion later published as an article.134 According to Priest, James argued that: 
All limitations on recovery on the grounds of privity of contract, he declares, 
should be eliminated. There are no reasons to limit strict liability to food prod-
ucts or to products for intimate bodily use. The most extraordinary feature of the 
food cases (to that point, the area of furthest success of James’s ideas) is how 
                                                                                                                                
notes to cases “that actually supported the assertions made in the text—cases that themselves 
had cited the first edition of the hornbook as the authority relied upon.”). 
129  THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 47. 
130  Cantu, supra note 116, at 341 & n.2, 377 (referring, by way of introduction, to the “brief 
history of events leading up to the adoption of Section 402A,” before going on to offer a 
somewhat confusing critique of the failure of courts to employ a “primary dictionary mean-
ing approach” to deciding whether a “product” was involved). 
131  2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
132  Lewis, supra note 9. 
133  See Priest, supra note 30, at 464–65 (arguing that the work of Friedrich Kessler and 
Fleming James laid the intellectual foundation for enterprise liability, and that Prosser’s 
work was derivative of Kessler and James, while giving Prosser credit for the art of his syn-
thesis). 
134  James, supra note 7. 
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trivial they are. “Surely greater danger lurks in a defective automobile wheel 
than in a pebble in a can of beans.”135 
Thus, food cases are trivial, amounting to little more than a pebble in a can, 
while the renewed industrial revolution of the post-war era filled the market 
with automobiles, airplanes, and power tools—products much more worthy of 
governance by a modern strict liability regime. To disagree would have most 
certainly (as Priest suggests) been seen at the time as an embrace of obsoles-
cence and a rejection of modernity.136 
Providing a counter-narrative of his own, but one that is revisionist history, 
Priest has argued that the “original intent” all along was for “the Section’s strict 
liability standard, with minor exceptions, to apply only to what we now call 
manufacturing defect cases.”137 In the next sentence, Priest goes on to explain 
that “Section 402A and its Comments were drafted with little more than manu-
facturing defect cases in mind.”138 But Priest’s explanation is misleading, even 
if in some respects true. Although the only cogent explanation for the com-
ments and the rule is to see both as only applying to manufacturing defects, that 
is only because unsafe food is, by definition, unsafe as the result of a manufac-
turing defect. In other words, Priest should have asserted that Section 402A and 
its Comments were drafted with little more than food in mind. 
                                                        
135  Priest, supra note 30, at 503. To suppose that food is trivial is to mistake its ubiquity for 
its lack of significance. As one cultural historian has aptly stated in offering a corrective to 
this notion, 
[f]ood is “everyday”—it has to be, or we would not survive for long. But food is never just 
something to eat. It is something to find or hunt or cultivate first of all; for most of human histo-
ry we have spent a much longer portion of our lives worrying about food, and plotting, working, 
and fighting to obtain it, than we have in any other pursuit. 
MARGARET VISSER, MUCH DEPENDS ON DINNER: THE EXTRAORDINARY HISTORY AND 
MYTHOLOGY, ALLURE AND OBSESSIONS, PERILS AND TABOOS, OF AN ORDINARY MEAL 12 
(1986). See also Stearns, supra note 7, at 425 (“Food is unique not only because of the in-
trinsic qualities that set food apart from anything else to which food can be compared; it is 
unique for the start of an ontology that food suggests. It is also unique for the interrelated-
ness of being that only food best reveals and defines. Food reminds us that, as living beings, 
we were born into a vulnerability of hunger and dependence.”). 
136  Priest, supra note 30, at 519 (“[E]mboldened by the wide academic consensus, judges 
embraced enterprise liability as an affirmation of their modernity and a denial of their obso-
lescence.”). 
137  George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2301, 2303 (1989). 
138  Id. For his part, and along these same lines, Owen uses all of this “legislative history” in 
a different way—namely to argue that the origin of Section 402A as a special rule for food, 
means that comments i, j, and k (as carried over to the final draft that applied to all types of 
products) “were directed exclusively to a narrow set of issues pertinent to a limited class of 
products, to wit, . . . food, whiskey, cigarettes, drugs, and similar products that carry una-
voidable dangers.” David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1382 
(2004). 
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CONCLUSION: A VICTORY LIKE PYRRHUS 
The two armies separated; and we are told that Pyrrhus said to one who was 
congratulating him on his victory, “If we are victorious in one more battle with 
the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.”139 
 
If the true uniqueness of food had been sufficiently noted, the lure of anal-
ogy might have been resisted. Had Prosser and Traynor and their band of tort 
warriors filled their ears with wax so as to not hear siren’s song, then the law of 
product liability might have been allowed to evolve in ways more organic, co-
herent, and well-founded. In particular, if Section 402A had been allowed to 
remain a special rule for food, albeit at the cost of depriving Prosser of his 
crowning glory, focus might have remained on the unique importance of food 
safety. Moreover, the idea of a hybrid warranty of quality might have grown to 
be accepted, and not been banished to the hinterlands as a legal “freak.” Per-
haps most of all, the urge to totalize—to find a tort theory of everything—
might have given way to a more careful evaluation of the foundations of prod-
ucts liability, and the starkly differing rationales for imposing liability for mak-
ing and selling different kinds of products, which are defective in different 
kinds of way. But instead, the counter-revolution occurred, in the “tort reform” 
and other movements that sought to counter what was seen as a pro-plaintiff 
bias in the law.140 Instead of peace, the “tort wars” continued, as did the parti-
san reports from the battlefields.141 And perhaps worst of all, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the plague of foodborne illness continues.142 
As one who has practiced in the area of products liability law for over 
twenty years, I think that Anita Bernstein has put the matter perfectly: 
                                                        
139  PLUTARCH, Life of Pyrrhus, in 9 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 417 (Bernadotte Perrin, trans. 1920). 
As previously noted, it is from Pyrrhus of Epirus that we get the meaning for the term pyr-
rhic victory, a victory won at a cost seemingly too high. 
140  Rustad, supra note 41, at 1127–28 (“[I]n the past few decades a counter-revolution has 
arisen which is reversing the expansion of victim’s [sic]. Spearheaded by representatives of 
powerful corporations and the medical establishment, this movement has had considerable 
success in its efforts to reverse the liberalization of tort remedies in the areas of products lia-
bility and medical malpractice.” (footnotes omitted)); see also WHITE, supra note 29, at 254–
80 (depicting the resurgence of negligence law and its displacement of strict liability through 
an appraisal of tort casebook and treatises in the 1980s and 1990s); Jung, supra note 45, at 
870 (“Not only did Prosser miss the legal issues that would define strict product liability in 
the 1970’s and 80’s, he also failed to anticipate the political dispute it would generate.”). 
141  Cf. Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1468–69 
(2007) (book review) (arguing that the tort reform movement was partly motivated “by an 
accurate understanding that, since the late 1950s, many defenders of the tort system have 
sought to challenge the principle that tort liability ought to be based on individual fault”). 
142  Stearns, supra note 7, at 442 (arguing, among other things, “that the law continues to fail 
in achieving its mission is proven simply by looking at the continuing plague of foodborne 
illness, a plague first made apparent during the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak. The 
law provides its stamp of approval but never really does its job of making the food it regu-
lates consistently safe to buy and eat”). 
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Coexisting with contract and tort, true products liability becomes a flexible 
doctrine that uses the approaches of both traditions. Wrongful imposition of risk, 
betrayed expectations, a breached bargain, careless design, and other concepts of 
products liability, which partake of both tort and contract, are concepts that il-
luminate cases. . . . True products liability, then, is a concept stripped not only of 
inapposite case paradigms but also political baggage.143 
To this I would add that true products liability is not merely a concept either; it 
is something that plays out in real life, where each of the dramatic moments 
constitutes more than words on page, more than a story in a book. And, in real 
life, when I have filed a lawsuit on behalf of someone injured by eating unsafe 
food—for example, cookie dough that contained E. coli O157:H7, or orange 
juice that contained Salmonella—the complaint never once failed to set forth 
both negligence and strict liability claims, and sometimes warranty claims as 
well. Believe it or not, no chaos ensued, and a kind of justice always managed 
to be achieved. For those who practice law on behalf of clients, it never really 
matters whether tort or contract provides a remedy or a defense. That is not the 
battle that matters in practice. Just as when you raise that fork to your mouth to 
take a bite, what matters is the safety of the food you are about to consume. In 
that moment, a special rule for food makes a lot of sense, and is not trivial at 
all. Odd that Prosser thought otherwise. 
                                                        
143  Anita Bernstein, How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1, 80–81 (1995). As 
White correctly points out, “virtually every buyer who has a strict tort claim for an injury 
caused by a defective product also has a potential claim in warranty for the same injury.” 
White, supra note 41, at 1067. 
